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   This dissertation analyses the role that mineral resources have played in visions of Greenlandic 
Independence over the last decade of Self Rule. As climate change and melting ice make Greenland 
greener, the trope of a “New North’ increasingly open to exploitation is reinforced.  However this 
depoliticising trope tends to erase any narrative of the Arctic as a homeland, making an engagement 
with political framings emerging from the Arctic countries themselves and a consideration of the 
ways their governments are co-opting such ideas crucial. This investigation endeavours to do just 
that by offering a more sustained engagement with the political discourses employed by 
Naalakkersuisut [the Self-Government of Greenland] regarding mining, building on previous work 
concerning non-renewable resource extraction and its significance for increased autonomy in 
Greenland. By carrying out a critical discourse analysis of recent government acts, speeches and 
policy documents which have not been subjected to scholarly scrutiny before, it will be able to offer 
new insights. Accordingly, this dissertation will seek to reinsert the ‘geo’ back into critical Arctic 
geopolitics by answering two research questions: ‘How has Naalakkersuisut constructed Greenland 
as a resource frontier?’ and ‘What priorities and challenges does Naalakkersuisut foresee for 
securing Greenland’s mining future?’. By considering the material and symbolic significance of the 
subsurface for territorial claims to statehood, it breaks new ground in the field of political geology, 
proving highly relevant for scholars interested in resource geographies, indigenous rights and self-
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“We have to choose on the one hand between unrestricted exploitation of our resources in order to 
gain more independence, and on the other hand the protection of our nature, which is so dear to us 
in order to maintain our cultural heritage.” 
- Josef Motzfeldt, Greenlandic Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2008 
 
   The above quotation from Motzfeldt which was given prior to the establishment of Greenlandic 
Self Rule perfectly pinpoints the central conflict in the case for Greenlandic Independence: that 
resource development in the name of increased autonomy is not without its risks. With such high 
social and environmental stakes at play, it is crucial to critically evaluate the role of Naalakkersuisut 
[Self Government of Greenland] in strategising Greenland’s mineral resources. By taking a unique 
methodological approach which analyses state-crafted documents that have not been 
comprehensively considered before, this dissertation offers a new entry point into the Greenlandic 
resource debate. This represents a move away from the more common socially or environmentally 
attentive approaches which focus on the attitudes of the general public or non-governmental 
organisations (see Hansen et al, 2009; Dingman, 2014; Ackrén, 2016; Nuttall, 2012, 2013; Bjørst, 
2016). In contrast, the primary focus of this dissertation is examining the ways in which 
Naalakkersuisut have constructed and naturalised Greenland as a resource frontier, actively 
promoting an image of Greenland as an emerging mining nation more than capable of ruling itself.   
 
   This research aim will be achieved through a critical discourse analysis of the Self-Government Act, 
the Mineral Resources Act, formal speeches given by the respective premiers of Naalakkersuisut 
over the last decade, and by careful consideration of the recent mineral resources strategy. The 
2014-2018 Oil and Minerals strategy also allows for an evaluation of the likelihood that Greenland 
can achieve the priorities and overcome the challenges it has laid out on its path to becoming a 
mining nation. By temporally delimiting the research to the period of Self Rule, this dissertation will 
be able to chart the relationship between geology and geopolitics more closely, with Poppel (2018: 
11) describing the years following 2009 as “epoch making” for Greenland. In doing so, it will not only 
deepen understandings of the role Naalakkersuisut have played in normalising extractive discourses, 
but will also make an important contribution to the emerging fields of critical Arctic geopolitics and 




discipline’s current era of more-than-human geographies which renegotiate society-nature relations, 
and so are better positioned to conceive of a critical geopolitics of earthly resources (Whatmore, 
2006, 2013; Clark, 2011; Elden, 2013; Dalby, 2013; Dittmer, 2014; Kama, 2019).    
  
1.2 Contextualising Greenland 
 
   On June 21st, 2009, a momentous shift in Greenland’s politics was initiated with the establishment 
of its Self-Government (Powell, 2016). Greenlandic Self-Rule represents a substantial step towards 
full autonomy from the Kingdom of Denmark, of which it is currently an autonomous overseas 
territory. It is worth expanding on what is meant by the ‘Kingdom of Denmark’ as the different terms 
for the constellations in which Greenland and Denmark are enmeshed are often used loosely. The 
Kingdom of Denmark or ‘Kongeriget Danmark’ refers to the geographical territories of Denmark, 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands (see Figure 1). An additional term, ‘Rigsfællesskabet’, which can be 
translated as the Community of the Realm, refers to the broader national imagination, collapsing the 
idea of the state, the nation, and the wider Kingdom into one (Powell, 2016). Although Greenland is 
self-governing under the 2009 Act, it remains part of the Kingdom, meaning Denmark retains 
authority over international matters like foreign policy and security. In many ways Greenland can be 
seen as a country of contradictions. Despite its name, 81% of Greenland’s landmass is covered by 
ice, meaning that although it is the world’s largest island, it has one of the smallest populations at 
just over 56,000 people who mostly inhabit the ice-free western coast (Statistics Greenland, 2018). 
Although Greenland is geologically associated with the North American continent, it is geopolitically 
considered a part of Europe due to its aforementioned 300-year relationship with Denmark, one 












   Greenland was colonised by the Danish-Norwegian missionary Hans Egede in 1721. Egede had 
been sent to find the long-lost Norse population and convert them to Lutheran Protestantism, but 
upon failing to find them, he set up base near present-day Nuuk and evangelised the Inuit instead 
(Powell, 2016). Greenland remained under Denmark’s ‘civilising’ mission until 1953, when it was 
officially decolonised through integration into the Kingdom of Denmark. Petersen (1995) notes that 
the Danes used the term koloni for both their trading station and the colonial mission, with the 
Danish colonial model being paternalistic and perhaps more benign than many of its European 
counterparts. However, this does not negate the epistemic violence and displacement that 
Greenlanders were subjected to under colonial rule (Rud, 2017). It was not until 1979 that 
Greenland gained limited autonomy in the form of its first Home Rule Government, which has been 
significantly advanced by Self Rule since 2009. This decolonising process has left Greenland with a 
“distinctly transitional character” and the sense of a national project yet to be completed (Gad, 
2017: 11).    
 
   In recent years, Greenland has garnered greater global attention as its melting ice sheet and 
calving glaciers have become emblematic of global warming. In tandem with climate change 
concerns has come increased international interest in the economic opportunities a greener 
Greenland could present, particularly in terms of increased access to natural resources and shipping 
routes (Wilson, 2017). Powell (2016) points to these multifarious and at time competing visions of 
Greenland, from a global laboratory for scientific research, to the epicentre of climate change, to a 
potential partner for Asian states seeking resources, and for its inhabitants,’ Kalaallit Nunaat’ - a 
homeland. Indeed, Greenland is one of the few jurisdictions globally with an indigenous majority, 
meaning Self Rule has put Greenland on a path towards potentially becoming the world’s first Inuit 
state (Kuokkanen, 2017; Nuttall, 2008). The largest stumbling block to achieving statehood is 
Greenland’s economic dependence on the Danish annual block grant of 3.5 billion DKK, accounting 
for a mammoth 60% of its budget revenue (Nuttall, 2012). Currently, the majority of Greenland’s 
export income comes from fishing, but it will need to expand and diversify its economy because it 
cannot hope to enter negotiations with the Kingdom of Denmark regarding full political 
independence until it is economically independent (Strandsbjerg, 2014). With this in mind, 
Naalakkersuisut has sought to build a stronger economy by developing Greenland’s mineral 







1.3 The Arctic as a Resource Frontier 
 
   In the twenty-first century, the Arctic has come to be positioned as a new energy province and 
resource frontier capable of feeding global demand for hydrocarbons and minerals. This has led to 
the Arctic being heralded as a “trove of opportunities for states, corporations and individuals [who 
seek] extraction of riches” (Steinberg et al. 2015: 16). Dodds and Nuttall (2016: 116) describe this 
extractivist rhetoric as part of a ‘scramble for the poles’ where an ‘El Dorado complex’ prevails, 
generating the idea that it is only a matter of time before desirable resources are exploited. Kroger 
(2019) considers this ‘race for resources’ within the context of the contemporary global land rush, 
arguing that there has been a notable increase in resource extraction in the Arctic since 2005. This 
has been in tandem with rising tensions over state’s sovereign rights to the North Pole seabed, 
following the sensationalisation of the Russian flag planting in 2007 (Dodds, 2008). The desire of 
Arctic states to assert their sovereignty and protect their mineral interests can also be seen in the 
recent proliferation of strategies and mineral policies aimed to attract investment, not only by 
Naalakkersuisut but across northern governments. Examples include the new wave of investment 
taking place in mining in northern Norway which now hosts 18 mines, accompanied by a new 
mineral law issued in 2010 and a specific mineral strategy in 2013 (Dale, Bay-Larsen and Skorstad, 
2018). In Murmansk, northern Russia, mining has been the primary economic activity for the last 
century, but a new federal government ecological policy was implemented in 2012 requiring greater 
environmental respect by industry (Newell and Henry, 2016). Despite the fall in market prices for 
many mineral resources in recent years checking the optimism of the early 2010s, most Arctic states 
have still made efforts to secure their place in the mineral market by modernising their legislation 
and so have retained the global gaze (Dale, Bay-Larsen and Skorstad, 2018).  
 
   Steinberg et al. (2015) contend that the resource frontier has become the most dominant and 
influential imaginary of the Arctic in recent years, obscuring environmentalist and indigenous 
discourses. Although it could be countered that climate change remains the more prevalent 
imaginary, global warming has in fact become closely tied to the resource frontier imaginary as its 
catalyst in what Stuhl (2013: 94) calls the ‘New North’ trope. This phrase draws attention to the 
collision of unprecedented global warming (affecting the Arctic at twice the average rate) with 
growing global demand for resources, whereby melting ice is thought to provide increased access to 
the hydrocarbons and minerals beneath. However, Stuhl (2013) is very wary of the dehistoricising 
nature of the “New North” which would appear to erase a long history of resource exploitation in 




with the geostrategic significance of certain resources such as cryolite and uranium becoming 
apparent in the mid 1900s (Secher, 2002; Berry, 2012; Nielsen and Knudsen, 2013). Furthermore, 
mineral extraction has been closely entwined with European exploration and imperialism as 
exemplified in Cameron’s (2015) discussion of the Bloody Falls massacre in Nunavut, Canada. 
Although considerable progress has since been made in terms of indigenous land rights, the Arctic 
continues to be viewed by outsiders as a ‘tabula rasa’ open to exploration and exploitation, with 
some viewing international mining companies’ endeavours as a form of neo-colonialism (Craciun, 
2016). Indeed, the well-documented idea of a ‘resource curse’ dictates that natural resource wealth 
does not necessarily translate into increased wellbeing for local populations, particularly when Arctic 
communities are only consulted in a cursory manner (Soros 2007; Gilberthorpe and Hilson, 2014). 
This being said, Nuttall (2010) argues that more indigenous communities are engaging in dialogue 
with governments and industry to express their interests regarding resource development, with 
institutions like the land claims agreements in Alaska and Canada and self-government in Greenland 
facilitating this.    
 
    In Canada and Alaska, land claims agreements act as “key building blocks” for furthering Inuit 
rights (ICC, 2009: np). However, the indigenously run institutions are not fully empowered because 
federal laws continue to restrict Inuit input and control over the subsurface still remains contested 
(Gerhardt, 2011). Of all the nationally separated Inuit, it is worth noting that the Russian Inuit of 
Chukotka have made the least progress towards political autonomy as their cause is low on 
Moscow’s political radar (Gerhardt, 2011). In a way, Greenland is in the best position to pursue 
statehood because as Eide (2009) reminds us, it is a large island isolated from Denmark, meaning it is 
faced with fewer challenges than Nunavut for example when working at a sub-state level. 
Loukacheva (2007) has written on legal and political autonomy in Greenland and Nunavut, 
comparing their visions for Inuit self-governance. Whereas Nunavut was carved out of the 
Northwest Territories of Canada as an integral part of the Nunavut land claims settlement, 
Greenlandic Home Rule was not rooted in indigenous use or occupation of the land (Loukacheva, 
2007). However, as Shadian (2014) argues, the Greenlandic government is often seen as a de facto 
indigenous authority due to the Inuit majority which elects it. Whereas the Government of Nunavut 
has sought a more Inuit inspired approach to decision-making via the incorporation of Inuit 
Qaujimajatuqangit values [‘that which the Inuit have long known’ i.e. traditional values] and through 
political decentralization, Greenland has pursued a process of political recentralisation (Henderson, 
2007: 35; Weber, 2014; Hicks and White, 2015). By centring politics in Nuuk and reducing the 




borrowed heavily from the Danish institutional structure and has largely sought to embrace the 
Westphalian imaginary of a bounded nation-state.  
 
1.4 From Home Rule to Self Rule: The Importance of Mineral Rights  
 
   Greenland’s push for autonomy has been tied to the pursuit of rights over its mineral resources for 
far longer than the last decade on which this dissertation focuses, thus some contextualisation is 
required. The formal incorporation of Greenland into the Kingdom of Denmark in 1953 can be 
viewed within the context of the global decolonisation movement following World War II, with Gad 
(2014) sceptically noting it served to defer true decolonisation by presenting Greenland as equal to 
Denmark, but with no power beyond two seats in the Folketing (Dingman, 2014). Dissatisfied with 
this arrangement and with an awareness of growing indigenous rights internationally, political 
mobilisation against inequality and a lack of cultural and political recognition culminated in the 
Home Rule Act of 1979 (Gad, 2017). Under Home Rule, Greenland set up its first government to 
which Denmark transferred several administrative functions (Erdal, 2013). Despite these 
achievements, debates around mineral resources were central to negotiations and were far from the 
success Greenland hoped for (Powell, 2016).   
 
   Poppel (2018) argues rights to the subsurface went unsolved by Home Rule because in accordance 
with the 1965 Legal Act of Mining, “all mineral resources in Greenland belong to the [Danish] state” 
and this judicial assertion was not wholly overturned by the Home Rule Act. The Home Rule 
Commission’s Report (1978: Section 8, 1) concluded that the “population of Greenland has 
fundamental rights to Greenland’s natural resources”, but this was a compromise as the Greenland 
delegation had strongly argued for a wording underscoring “the fundamental rights” (Petersen, 
1995). Poppel (2018) points to the way in which the Commission was able to use the omission of 
‘the’ to argue the term “fundamental rights” was merely a declaration of political principles, rather 
than offering a judicial foundation. The battle for Greenland’s full authority over its own resources 
was therefore left for another day, namely the 1st of January 2010 when the Mineral Resources Act 
came into force in line with commitments made in the Self-Government Act, representing a 
landmark achievement following over thirty years of disagreement with Denmark. In addition to 
securing Greenland’s absolute jurisdiction over all underground resources and territorial waters, the 
Self Rule Act recognised Greenlanders claim to peoplehood, allowing for the possibility of full 





   Discussions regarding ownership and development of Greenland’s mineral resources have been 
critical to both the Home Rule and Self Rule debates and continue to be so in present day politics. 
This was well exemplified in 2013 where the general election was fought over the prospect of 
uranium mining and associated labour law, with Siumut’s Aleqa Hammond taking back control from 
Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) on a pro-uranium but fairly anti-foreign labour campaign. (Scrutton, 2013; 
Powell, 2016). The Greenlandic parliament (Inatsisartut’s) decision to repeal the Danish ban on 
uranium mining later that year was highly contentious, representing a ground-breaking shift in the 
pursuit of Greenlandic independence via resource extraction (Nuttall, 2013). The uranium debate 
has remained topical, flaring up in both the 2014 and 2018 general elections as a subject over which 
the two biggest political parties disagree, with Siumut in favour and IA in opposition (Kristensen and 
Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2018; Thelocal.dk., 2018). This is an important point of division because both 
parties are broadly left wing and in favour of independence, although Siumut is more centrist and 
pro-independence than IA as is usefully summarised in Gad’s (2017: 24) diagram (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: The Greenlandic party system organised along two axes: the traditional economic right-left wing axis and an 





   That Siumut have dominated Naalakkersuisut since 2013 (see Appendix B for a summary of general 
election results over the period of Self-Rule) reveals the power of the resource frontier imaginary in 
visions of Greenlandic independence, as will be discussed in the following chapters. Chapters one to 
three contextualise this research, and chapters four and five offer a discussion regarding 
Greenland’s mining future based around a critical discourse analysis of parliamentary acts, speeches, 






























CHAPTER TWO: Arctic Resources and Critical Geopolitics: A Theoretical 
Grounding 
 
2.1 Reinserting the Geo into Critical Arctic (Geo)politics 
 
“Greenland’s minerals constitute a symbolic as well as economic bridge between Greenland of the 
past and a future independent nation. Any discussion about the island’s mineral wealth is therefore 
by its very nature (geo)political” (Vedby, 2013: 3) 
 
   By its very definition, geography is a form of earth-writing derived from the Greek terms geo 
(earth) and graphia (writing), and so it follows that geopolitics should seek to engage with the 
earthly realms of politics. Today, the modifier ‘geo’ in geopolitics is popularly taken to be 
synonymous with world politics, or at best the geographical factors which influence international 
relations, however Dalby (2007) has called for a geopolitics which takes earth systems and their 
dynamics seriously. This dissertation will endeavour to take up Dalby’s request by paying close 
attention to the materialities of mining in Greenlandic political discourse, using a critical geopolitical 
approach to give the ‘geo’ in (geo)politics the weighting it deserves. This research is perfect for such 
a task because as Vedby (2013: 3) notes above, resource politics in Greenland is “by its very nature 
(geo)political”. However, before delving into more recent theorising which has reworked critical 
geopolitics to incorporate a posthumanist and material slant, we must consider the origins of critical 
geopolitics itself. The term ‘critical geopolitics’ was coined by the pioneering political geographer Ó 
Tuathail (1986; 1996) and later developed by the likes of Dalby and Agnew, with the aim of 
reconceptualising geopolitics as a form of political discourse, rather than simply a descriptive term 
for grand statecraft or realist foreign policy (Dodds, 2001). Grounded in post-structural theory, 
critical geopolitics has primarily involved careful analysis of geopolitical reasoning and practice which 
seeks to simplify people-place relations (Dodds, 2014). Such questioning of spatial abstractions 
employed by nation-states has usually been pursued through discourse analysis of foreign policy 
documents and government speeches as this allows for critical engagement with the tools of 
statecraft. It is important to note that despite its self-aware edge, critical geopolitics has been 
critiqued by scholars of feminist geopolitics who argue its textual reliance and emphasis on 
discourse have dematerialised geopolitics (Dittmer, 2014). In response, there has been some effort 
towards a material turn in critical geopolitics which acknowledges more everyday and embodied 
experiences, with Le Billon (2013) arguing that because much critical geopolitics remains based on 




therefore pursues a more materialised critical geopolitics by considering the role of the non-human 
mineral world.  
 
    Dodds (2014) advocates for an object-centred approach to geopolitics, arguing that too often the 
focus of critical geopolitics has been on territorially defined states and politicians at the expense of 
engaging with other more-than-human aspects. As Dodds (2014: 96) notes, “geopolitical 
imaginations and practices are embedded and emboldened by their relationship to a vast array of 
things”, with his discussion of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline being particularly productive. Not only has 
the object of the pipeline been significant in global energy debates, it has also been instrumental in 
indigenous politics, making it emblematic of a contested resource geopolitics. In Alaska, an upsurge 
in oil prices and growing anxieties over American energy security in the 1970s transformed the oil 
potential in Prudhoe Bay into a lucrative resource, but the pipeline itself proved to be a site of 
conflict. Conservationists opposed the rush for oil and were concerned for the fragile Arctic 
ecosystem, and the indigenous population expressed alarm over the blockading effect the pipeline 
would have on migration routes as well as querying how they would benefit from the resource 
extraction. From this, the Native Claims Settlement Act was born whereby native Alaskans would 
receive money and federal land in compensation for renouncing their land claims (Dodds, 2014). The 
Trans-Alaskan pipeline therefore brought discussions around the interaction of indigenous rights and 
resource geopolitics to the fore and laid the foundation for work such as Barry’s (2013) on the 
material politics of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline in eastern Europe. Like Barry’s work, this 
dissertation will endeavour to contribute to the proliferation of politicised geological knowledges. In 
their chapter on materialising Greenland within a critical Arctic geopolitics, Dodds and Nuttall (2017: 
140) call for this spatially focused sub-discipline of critical geopolitics to be “rooted in materiality 
where the Arctic is not simply a backdrop for human events” but is actively enrolled. Locating 
Greenland within critical Arctic geopolitics therefore requires “a consideration of the science and 
politics of and about ice, land and water, as well as the subsurface and Greenland’s depths and 
widths”. It is these depths that this dissertation will metaphorically excavate in order to understand 
how the subterranean is politicised (Dodds and Nuttall, 2017: 152). 
 
2.2 Natural Resource Geographies: Resource Becoming, the Vertical and the Volumetric 
 
   Human engagement with the mineral world has an extensive history which reaches as far back as 
our existence as a species on this Earth, with its centrality indicated by the widespread three-age 




some argue we have moved away from such resource dependence in the twenty-first century 
capitalist period of “resource triumphalism” and “postscarcity narratives” accredited to modernity, 
this dissertation disputes such claims by pointing to the continued political significance of natural 
resources for development, as is the case in Greenland, and indeed much of the world where energy 
security and resource wars reveal that “minerals remain irrevocably linked to power” (Bridge, 2001: 
2149; Boivin and Owoc, 2004: 1). Despite these fruitful cross-sections between geology and politics, 
political geology is a field which is only just emerging because until recently, it was widely assumed 
that social scientists should confine their attention to the Earth’s surface (Donovan and Bobbette, 
2019). Barry (in Powell et al, 2017) also utilises the term ‘political geology’ in his discussion of 
Anatolia which constitutes the majority of modern-day Turkey, arguing that we must rethink the 
political significance of geology because multiple anthropologists have noted the connections 
residents make between earthquakes and the disaster of the state. This is not to say that political 
geology advocates a return to the environmentally deterministic attitudes of the nineteenth century, 
as it does not imagine that politics flows directly from movements of the earth, but it does make the 
case for the more-than-human geographies of political life (Barry, 2017). Geographical scholars are 
particularly well placed to contribute to this new field as it has long been the remit of geography to 
work at the interface of the natural and social realms in an interdisciplinary way, thereby breaking 
new ground (Gregory, 2009).  With this in mind, this dissertation will respond to calls from 
geographical scholars like Phillipe Le Billon (2013), Stuart Elden (2013) and Julie Klinger (2015) who 
request more critical geopolitical works on resources; studies that consider the vertical and earthly 
aspects of territory; and explore geology as a science of territoriality respectively. 
 
   Before progressing any further, it is crucial to consider what exactly is implied by the term ‘natural 
resource’ and how it is politicised. Erich Zimmerman (1933:3) was one of the first geographers to 
argue that despite coming from ‘nature’, resources are socially constructed through their 
identification, processing, and use by humans, hence “resources are not; they become”. Richardson 
and Weszkalnys (2014: 12) similarly talk of resource making as a process of “turning nature into 
culture par excellence” whereby natural resources are not ‘out there’ waiting to be seized but are in 
flux, only ‘becoming’ as resource materialities through human appraisal and labour.  Using coal as 
his example, Zimmerman (1933) argued it was not the chemical properties of coal such as the ability 
to store energy and release it upon combustion which made coal a resource, but the fact that it 
could fit existing socio-technical arrangements and so supply energy during industrialisation (Bridge, 
2009). Zimmerman’s (1933: 3) dictum that “to be considered for its resources, the environment 




removed from more recent scholarship which aims to dissolve the binary between nature and 
culture (Latour, 1993; Haraway, 1997, Swyngedouw, 1999). A parallel can be drawn between 
Zimmerman’s coal case study and the newfound relevance of rare earth elements, iron, copper, zinc, 
gold and gemstones for solving Greenland’s economic and political dependence on the Kingdom of 
Denmark. In this way, the productive position natural resources occupy as a cultural category is 
apparent because they designate particular parts of the non-human world as valuable to humanity, 
much like the way diamonds have become associated with a complex combination of social 
understandings about wealth, beauty and love despite being nothing but lumps of carbon  (Bridge, 
2009; Hartwick, 1998; Le Billon, 2006). The political life of geological resources should therefore be 
seen not just as “a product of the actual utilities of their chemical properties” but also in regard to 
“ideas about their significance, and different perceptions of how these material and meaningful 
properties might serve diverse territorialities over time” (Klinger, 2015: 574). 
 
   The geographer Philippe Le Billon (2013) discusses the politics of resources in the context of war 
and finds that geopolitical studies have tended to concentrate on areas like oil security in the Middle 
East or ‘blood diamonds’ in Africa, erasing the Arctic from the picture. Furthermore these studies are 
often framed around essentialised ‘resource wars’ rather than engaging with individual nation-state 
narratives and their motivations for exploiting certain geological resources. Bridge (2009) argues 
that this framework of inter-state conflict inherited from the realist school of International Relations 
is a limiting way of thinking about the politics of resources because it overlooks other scales and 
forms of political struggle (Le Billon, 2007). This study will expand scholarly work on the politics of 
resources by being situated in Arctic Greenland and engaging with its postcolonial struggle for 
independence through the medium of resource politics.  The theoretical question therefore 
transforms into one of how we should conceptualise resource spaces. Richardson and Weszkalnys 
(2005: 7) usefully offer the idea of “resource environments” in order to redirect analytical attention 
away from resources as essentialised subjects assumed to exist “in nature” and towards the complex 
arrangement of “physical stuff, extractive infrastructures, calculative devices, discourses of the 
market and development, the nation and the corporation [and] everyday practices” within which 
resources are situated. This approach challenges capitalist forms of resource extraction which cast 
resources as dead matter disembedded from the environments in which they are found rather than 
as part of lively human/nonhuman interactions (Tsing, 2005). Bridge (2001: 2149) also calls for an 
understanding of resource spaces which re-embeds resources in their physical and socio-political 
environment of origin, arguing that extractive spaces are “constructed through a discursive dialectic 




commodity”. He calls for academics to move beyond these “naïve geographies” which only explain 
commodity supply zones in terms of resource endowment, rather than appreciating how resource 
spaces are actively produced through political choices and practices of exploration and exploitation 
(Bridge, 2001: 2154).  
 
   Lastly, the likes of Elden (2013), Bridge (2013) and Dodds and Nuttall (2017) have advocated for a 
major reconceptualization of territory which repositions the vertical and volumetric as metrics of 
equal importance to area. In his seminal paper ‘Secure the volume: vertical geopolitics and the 
depths of power’, Elden argues that depth is often neglected in discussions of territory which favour 
surface borders. Graham (2004: 12) was the first academic to coin the term “vertical geopolitics” 
with reference to militarised airspace above ground in Baghdad, but much of his thinking draws on 
the work of Eyal Weizmann(2002: 3) who has criticised geopolitics for being a “flat discourse” which 
“largely ignores the vertical dimension and tends to look across rather than cut through the 
landscape”. This areal emphasis should not be taken for granted as it is a cartographic imagination   
inherited from the military and political spatialities of the modern nation-state. Despite offering a 
challenge, new work on verticality has mostly been orientated upwards, and so Elden (2013) calls for 
us to look down and consider the implications that vertical geopolitics has for the ground beneath 
our feet. Although he primarily focuses on the sub-surface politics of tunnels, Elden notes that 
resources below the earth’s surface are also a major source of conflict and contestation. Bridge 
(2013) takes up Elden’s invitation to evaluate how territory functions at depth by focusing on the 
political and legal techniques nation-states and corporations adopt in order to lay claim to natural 
resources such as groundwater, hydrocarbons, and minerals. His work not only reminds geographers 
to think in 3D, but also reflects on how practices of territorialisation (securing space to achieve 
certain agendas) are volumetric: a combination of areal and vertical. Indeed, Bridge (2013: 56) 
emphasises that “volume is a primary metric of anticipation and potential: calculations of what 
space contains […] and what contained materials mean that space could become, are essential to 
the performance of resource landscapes”. Dodds and Nuttall (2017) similarly promote a “volumetric 
geopolitics” in their approach to the Greenlandic ice sheet and continental shelf claims. The 
concepts of vertical and volumetric geopolitics are therefore highly applicable to this dissertation’s 
investigation of the geopolitical role played by sub-surface minerals in contemporary Greenland, 







CHAPTER THREE: Research Approach 
 
3.1 Research Aims and Questions 
 
   This dissertation analyses the role mineral resources have played in visions of Greenlandic 
Independence over the last decade. Although it will build on previous work regarding the politics of 
non-renewable resource extraction in Greenland (Nuttall, 2008, 2012, 2017; Serjersen, 2015; Bjørst 
2016; Powell, 2016; Poppel, 2018) as well as direct discussions about the relationship between 
Greenland’s mineral riches and independence (Dingman, 2014; Mazza, 2015; Taagholt and Brooks, 
2016; Vikström and Högselius, 2017), it offers a more sustained engagement with political discourses 
employed by Naalakkersuisut regarding mining via critical discourse analysis of government acts, 
speeches and policy documents. Such a close engagement with Greenlandic state-generated 
documents has not been done before in relation to mining, meaning this dissertation has much to 
contribute to the emerging fields of critical Arctic geopolitics and political geology. To aid the 
analysis of these documents, two key questions have been identified that frame the analysis: 
 
Q1. How has Naalakkersuisut constructed Greenland as a resource frontier, and to what end?  
 
Q2. What are the priorities and challenges to a mining future, as presented by Naalakkersuisut in its 
2014-18 Oil and Mineral Strategy?   
 
   These questions will be answered in the two discussion chapters, with chapter four focusing on the 
ways in which Naalakkersuisut have framed Greenlandic minerals as the key to achieving statehood. 
This will be done by analysing the discourses of the Self-Government Act and the Mineral Resources 
Act, as well as by closely engaging with narratives drawn upon by different Premiers in select 
speeches given over the last decade. Chapter five moves on to consider the most recent and 
comprehensive Oil and Mineral Strategy from 2014-2018, with careful attention paid to the 
priorities and challenges it highlights in terms of securing a mining future for Greenland. Finally, 
chapter six draws this dissertation’s findings together by highlighting the ways in which mineral 








3.2 Methodological Approach  
 
   In order to operationalise the research questions above, I have investigated Greenlandic discourses 
regarding resource extraction within parliamentary acts, speeches and policy documents using 
critical discourse analysis (CDA). It was important to choose appropriate texts pertaining to 
Greenlandic mining because as Angermüller (2001: 8) posits, texts act as “recorded traces of 
discourse activity” which can be accessed via discourse analysis, leading to a deeper understanding 
of geopolitical reasoning (O’Tuathail, 2002). When choosing primary texts, it is crucial that they are 
seen as credible as this is where dominant discourses tend to be found, hence why Hansen (2006: 
74) notes that “presidential statements, speeches, and interviews in the case of foreign policy” tend 
to be prioritised in critical geopolitics, with representatives of the state naturalised as actors whose 
representations of reality are legitimate (Buzan et al. 1998). Following this logic and because my 
research questions are orientated towards understanding how Naalakkersuisut is representing itself 
and Greenland, parliamentary acts, key speeches by the Premiers of the last decade, and the most 
recent mineral strategy form my primary documents (see appendix A for a comprehensive table of 
documents analysed). Triangulation of these texts provides a richer understanding of mining debates 
in Greenland because as Hoggart et al (2002: 212) argue, it “enhance[s] capacities for interpreting 
meaning and behavior” by offering multiple routes to the same conclusion. The Self-Government 
and Mineral Resource Acts establish Inatsisartut’s legal position by framing mineral resources as 
important and setting out what can be achieved in terms of their development. Speeches by Kuupik 
Kleist, Aleqa Hammond and Kim Kielsen can be used to track continuity and change in the extractive 
discourse across the whole period of Self Rule, with each Premier reflecting Naalakkersuisut’s 
evolving stance as the leadership and parties which constitute it change. Finally the 2014-2018 Oil 
and Minerals Strategy reveals in greater detail what Naalakkersuisut deems to be salient for realizing 
Greenland’s mining future. Through a careful analysis of Greenlandic state policy surrounding 
mining, this dissertation works to fill the lacuna Ó Tuathail’s (2002) identifies in political geography 
whereby practical geopolitics (the domain of policy making) has been neglected in favour of formal 
and popular geopolitics.    
 
   As Hopf (2004: 31) argues, discourse analysis is a “political theory as much as a method of inquiry” 
because it commits a researcher to a specific epistemological and ontological framework (Jørgensen 
and Phillips 2002). Müller (2010: 4) also picks up on this entanglement by delineating that discourse 
analysis is a methodology rather than a method, with the difference being that it is not just a tool for 




constructive effect of language and social practice” (Wood and Kroger, 2000). Through this 
framework, a discourse analytical approach allows for closer critical engagement with assumptions 
and paradoxes within Greenlandic mining debates, revealing how they are constructed and 
maintained through discursive ‘work’. Here it is important to outline what is meant by the term 
‘discourse’ which has been popularized in the social sciences by the work of Michel Foucault. 
Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:2) describe discourse as “a particular way of talking about and 
understanding the world or an aspect of the world” because, as Sharp (2009: 19) usefully asserts,         
discourses “define the parameters of what can be known and understood at any point in history and 
place”, thereby naturalizing a certain representation of reality. The primary aim of discourse analysis 
is therefore to evaluate the production of meaning over time to enable the deconstruction of certain 
understandings of the world. Importantly, there is no single way to carry out critical discourse 
analysis (CDA), much to the chagrin of more meticulous and methodologically-minded academics. In 
his paper on ‘doing discourse analysis in critical geopolitics’, Müller (2010: 2) states that there is no 
established methodology and that claims to ‘do discourse analysis’ are frequently accompanied by 
“a rather vague specification of the methodology that underpins this analysis”. Although many 
critiques of critical geopolitics have condemned CDA’s obsession with text and lack of precision or 
replicability, such an approach does allow for greater flexibility with Torfing (1999: 292) arguing that 
“discourse theorists must remain methodological bricoleurs and refrain from developing an all-
purpose technique for discourse analysis”. In an effort to be more transparent, this dissertation 
follows Cope’s (2010) CDA strategy by identifying manifest and latent codes within the text in order 
to determine recurring discursive themes.  
 
   In line with the post-structural thinking which characterises discourse analysis, this dissertation will 
endeavour to display critical reflexivity, and so I as the author fully acknowledge that I am not a 
“dematerialised, disembodied entity” but play a constitutive role in shaping the outcome of the 
research (Dowling, 2000; England, 1994). My positionality as a young British woman will no doubt 
have affected my worldview and interpretation of the documents under analysis; however I will seek 
to be attentive and present the political geographies of mining in Greenland fairly as I see them 
without distortion or misrepresentation of the data, all of which has been taken from the public 
domain. In terms of the methodological limitations of this research, the only significant drawback 
has been the necessary reliance on unofficial English translations of government documents, given 
the impossibility of learning Danish or Kalaallisut to fluency within the 9-month time span of this 
master’s. However, the fact that all the supposedly ‘unofficial’ translations have been taken directly 




official documents intended for an international audience.  This means that although some nuances 
of meaning may be lost in translation which is unfortunate given the emphasis CDA places on 
language, this research is able to offer an important additional insight into how Greenland is 
positioning itself as a global player on the international stage through the use of English as a lingua 
franca, with its resource frontier branding aimed at an international audience.   
 
   Furthermore, it is important to note that despite the multiple entry-points available into the 
Greenlandic mining debate and the broad applications of this dissertation, it cannot be exhaustive. 
Taking a critical geopolitical approach brings government rhetoric to the forefront as is the intention 
of this dissertation, but this means that other factors must be relegated.  For this reason, it will not 
delve into corporate mining perspectives, the views of environmental non-governmental 
organisations, or debates around the lack of public-participation in any great detail, but such 
research has already been carried out (see Hansen et al 2016; Nuttall, 2012; 2014; Dingman, 2014, 
Ackrén, 2016, Bjørst, 2017). My focus will remain directly on resource extraction and how mineral 
resources have been strategised, rather than meandering into alternative routes to achieving 
economic independence such as Greenland’s developing tourism or fishing industry. It  
is also beyond the scope of this dissertation to offer a close analysis of developing Greenlandic-
Chinese relations which fall more within the realms of IR. Lastly it is important to note that like all 
social sciences research, this dissertation cannot offer any definitive answers as to whether, how, or 
indeed when Greenland should become independent. As Gerhardt (2011: 12) states, “the political 
path taken by the Greenlandic indigenous people is not something that we, as outsiders, can or 
should judge”, nor is it something anyone is capable of predicting, but it is a fruitful topic to reflect 
upon. This political geographical investigation therefore views itself as an intervention into the 
domestic politics of a not-quite-state as it seeks to reify its status by looking to its foundations: the 












CHAPTER FOUR: Scripting and Narrating the Resource Frontier - A Study of 




   Frontiers and resource frontiers in particular are tricky to define and locate, being both 
theoretically and also physically manifested (Nuttall, 2017). Geological maps are one of the most 
popular purveyors of the resource frontier and have therefore become an increasingly dominant 
image of Greenland which “hint seductively at what lies underground”, acting as a “statement for 
the potential and possibility for extracting new minerals” (Nuttall, 2017: 46). In this way, pockets of 
lucrative minerals on ice-free land and blocks portioned off for hydrocarbon exploration off 
Greenland’s coast visually depict and so actively produce Greenland’s resource frontier, both 
materially and discursively. It is worth noting here that as Webb (1964: 2) first opined with regards 
to America’s wild west, the frontier should not be thought of as a “line to stop at”, but instead as an 
“area inviting entrance”. Drawing on resource frontier literature from other parts of the world offers 
some insight into Greenland’s situation. While Barney (2009) describes the enclosure and 
commodification of nature in Laos to be indicative of the relational zones of economy, nature, and 
society with resource frontiers occupying spaces of capitalist transition, Murray Li (2014: 13) draws 
on almost twenty years of ethnographic research in Indonesia to argue that frontiers are “coveted 
places, envisaged by various actors as sites of potential”. Meanwhile, Peluso and Lund (2013) 
highlight the ways in which frontier thinking is enrolled in practices of territorialisation, whereby 
places, people and resources are claimed and controlled.   
  
   Dodds and Nuttall (2016: 118) arguing that ‘frontier speak’ should be seen as a crucial tool of 
statecraft because it “creates the very thing that it names”, contributing to the active reimagination 
of Greenland as a place of abundance and opportunity for resource extraction. Indeed, Bridge (2001: 
2154) argues that resource frontiers are constructed through “expert discourses relating to 
mineralogy, mineral economics, law; by the implementation of technologies that locate, evaluate, 
and process nature into separable, extractable categories; and by the actions of the state which 
mediate this capitalization of production conditions by normalising discourses of growth and 
development”. It is these actions of the state, namely the production of favourable legislation and 
government speeches which frame the resource frontier as Greenland’s hope for the future, which 
this chapter will focus on. It will begin with an analysis of the centrality of mining and mineral rights 
provided for in Greenland’s 2009 Self-Government Act which laid the foundations for Self Rule, 




resource frontier in its 2010 Mineral Resources Act, before finally navigating the narratives 
employed by a succession of Greenlandic Premiers in public speeches which invariably frame 
minerals as the key to achieving statehood.   
 
4.2 Greenland’s Self-Government Act: Seeking Subsurface Rights and Sovereignty?  
 
"When the Greenlandic government invites in extractive industries, the Self Govt Act not only frames 
the possibilities but drives the strategic thinking, ambitions, and the process itself"  
(Sejersen, 2015: 28)  
 
   As the above quotation indicates, the Self-Government Act (SGA) has been foundational to the 
very existence and functioning of Greenland’s Self Rule Government, and so this document is the 
best place to start when thinking about Greenland’s growing autonomy and developing mineral 
resource sector. It was drawn up in response to a referendum on further devolution held in 
November 2008 in which a resounding majority (75.54%) voted in favour of Self Rule (Powell, 2016). 
The document’s primary purpose is to recognise the population of Greenland as a people, to 
acknowledge their right to self-determination as part of Self Rule, and to outline the pursuant 
transfer of responsibilities from Denmark’s Folketing to Greenland’s Inatsisartut. Following the trend 
stressed earlier that the rights to its subsurface have formed an important part of Greenland’s fight 
for self-determination, the SGA establishes that the rights to exploit its land falls to Greenland. 
Strandsbjerg (2014: 267) emphasises that “developing a stronger economy is directly linked to 
increased autonomy within the 2009 Self-Rule set-up” and that it is the government’s official policy 
to develop its natural resource sector as a vital new economic pillar.  
 
   From the outset, the somewhat awkward politico-legal positioning of the SGA becomes apparent. 
The opening preamble states that “We, Margrethe the second, by God’s Grace Queen of Denmark, 
hereby announce that: The Danish parliament has passed the following Act” (Folketing, 2009: 1). As 
Wilson (2017) argues, the very fact the SGA is an act passed by the Folketing and in the ten years 
since has not been accompanied by mirroring legislation from Inatsisartut means that the authority 
of Greenland’s Self-Government is still solely derived from Danish Law. Although Wilson’s (2017: 
517) point that this leaves the Naalakkersuisut on “legally shaky ground” because the SGA could be 
repealed by the Folketing at any time is technically true, this political outcome is incredibly unlikely 
considering the Folketing’s support for Greenland’s “right of self-determination” and the 




(Folketing, 2009: 1). It is certainly within Danish interests to remain on good terms with Greenland if 
it is to have any hope of retaining its foothold in Arctic affairs should Greenland gain independence 
(Jacobsen, 2016). In this regard, the SGA’s recognition “that the people of Greenland is [sic] a people 
pursuant to international law with the right of self-determination” has more weight as it is infused 
with international validity and acknowledges Greenland’s right to independence, with considerable 
ramifications for both the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland.  
  
   The most important chapter of the SGA for investigating the centrality of mineral resources is the 
third, which pertains to economic relations between the Danish and Greenlandic governments. Over 
half of its sections are devoted to dealing with mineral resource activities alone. Importantly, it lays 
out the freezing of the Danish block grant at DKK 3,439.6 million although this is based on 2009 price 
levels and wages so adjustments are made for any increase in general price and wage index each 
year. This put the subsidy at 3.7 billion DKK in 2017 which accounted for more than 50% of 
Greenland’s government revenues (McGwin, 2018; Index Mundi, 2018). Section 6 of chapter three 
states that any fields of responsibility taken over by the Greenlandic Self-Government must become 
its financial burden. This makes the need for additional sources of income all the more urgent if 
Greenland is to maintain its standard of service provision, a task which Erdal (2013) argues will be 
challenging given Greenland’s low-skilled labour force and ageing population which will likely 
necessitate increased public spending.  That section 7 which follows directly on dictates that 
revenue from mineral resource activities will accrue to the Greenland Self-Government authorities 
seems a clear indication that the mining sector is being situated as the solution to diminishing 
Greenland’s economic dependence on Denmark. Section 8 builds on this, stating that Greenland is 
free to extract minerals and hydrocarbons on its own territory, but once a commercially viable 
mining sector has been established and Greenland is making more than 75 million DKK from it (with 
adjustments for inflation), the excess will be split 50:50 between the Danish and Greenlandic 
authorities with the Danish share then being returned to Greenland, but the block grant being 
reduced by an equal amount. The reduction of the block grant is significant not just for the fiscal 
practicalities of independence, but also symbolically because as the anthropologist Jens Dahl (2005: 
152) has stated, transfers from Denmark psychologically “perpetuates a dependency complex 
reminiscent of colonialism”.  Silences in discourse can be just as revealing if not more so than what is 
said, thus it is interesting to note that no alternative income-generating activities are discussed in 
the SGA beyond mining. This follows what Wilson and Stammler (2015) contend in that even before 




SGA therefore promulgates the assumption that resource extraction is the best and indeed only 
answer to Greenland achieving independence, naturalising this discourse in law.  
 
   Chapter 4 acts as a reminder of Greenland’s limbo-like statehood status and the ultimately 
unequal power relations between Greenland and Denmark. It deals with foreign affairs and 
reinforces Denmark’s overarching authority regarding matters of the Rigsfællesskabet, of which 
Greenland remains a part. In particular, it emphasises that “foreign and security policy matters are 
affairs of the realm” thus “powers granted to Naalakkersuisut in this Chapter shall not limit the 
Danish authorities’ constitutional responsibility and powers in international affairs” (Folketing, 2009: 
3). Scale therefore matters because on the international level at which statehood is recognised, 
Denmark can continue to represent Greenland and have the final say unless an issue “exclusively 
concerns Greenland and entirely relates to fields of responsibility taken over” (Folketing, 2009: 3). 
This becomes complicated when it comes to cases of ambiguous responsibility as can be seen with 
uranium, which is both a resource owned by Greenland, and a radioactive element that falls under 
the Danish defence and security remit. For this reason, Vestergaard (2015) interprets the uranium 
debate as a test case of the provisions of the SGA.  
 
   The SGA’s final chapter proves particularly pertinent because it engages with the issue of 
Greenlandic sovereignty and access to independence. It states that the “decision regarding 
Greenland’s independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland” after which negotiations 
between the two governments will begin “with a view to the introduction of independence for 
Greenland”, presenting an independent Greenlandic state as a genuine possibility for the future 
(Folketing, 2009: 5). The chapter ends with perhaps the most significant statement of the SGA: 
“Independence for Greenland shall imply that Greenland assumes sovereignty over the Greenlandic 
territory” (Folketing, 2009: 5). Wilson (2017) draws our attention to the phrasing that Greenland will 
“assume” rather than assert sovereignty, introducing some healthy scepticism regarding Greenland’s 
ability to exercise all its sovereign responsibilities given its limited human resources and 
infrastructure despite boasting the world’s longest coastline. He concludes that the idea of an 
independent Greenland will remain “chimerical” until practical solutions to the sovereignty problem 
are found (Wilson, 2017: 516).  
  
    However, Wilson’s pragmatic approach requires further problematisation because both 
sovereignty and territory are dense with meaning and so have theoretical as well as practical 




political community” and Bartleson (2006: 467) follows a similar line regarding its finality by 
suggesting it is often viewed as an “indivisible and discrete condition”. This claim to indivisibility is 
rarely the de facto case as exemplified by Greenland’s partial claims to authority through existing 
Self Governance, however independence would ostensibly provide such ultimate authority. Territory 
is wrapped up in ideas of sovereignty because land falls under the ownership of the aforementioned 
authority, but territory should not be misrepresented as a mere cognate of land. Geographers have 
long emphasised the political power dynamics at work in the term ‘territory’, but Elden (2013) 
argues they do not go far enough in acknowledging its volumetric dimensions. By stating that 
Greenland could assume sovereignty over the Greenlandic territory, the SGA is in essence asserting 
Naalakkersuisut’s future right to ultimate power over the land and indeed the resources beneath it.  
Tellingly, in his interviews with Greenlanders regarding the significance of the SGA, Kuokkanen 
(2017) found that recognition as a people, independence, and subsurface rights were referenced 
most frequently. Almost half of his respondents cited the right to Greenland’s mineral resources 
(with the mineral resource area listed among those to be transferred to Naalakkersuisut in the 
schedule at the back of the SGA) as its most significant aspect, with one interviewee stating that this 
is not only important for the purposes of economic self-sufficiency, but also because now “we own 
our ground we walk on”, reflecting the material and symbolic power of resource ownership(Mariia 
Simonsen, April 8, 2013 in Kuokkanen, 2017: 188).   
 
4.3 Naturalising Greenland’s Resource Frontier? Unearthing the Mineral Resources Act.  
 
   Under the Greenland Self-Government Act, the ‘mineral resource area’ was the first field of 
responsibility to be devolved to the new Self Rule government on January 1st, 2010 under 
Inatsisartut’s Mineral Resources Act (MRA). This was considered to be of “utmost importance” if the 
Self-Government was to be “of real substance” because the SGA had already acknowledged that all 
revenue from mineral resource activities (collected from licence fees, tax, ownership etc) would 
accrue to Greenland in the first instance, but this would be fairly meaningless if Naalakkersuisut had 
no control over the resource activities themselves (Explanatory notes to MRA, 2009: 1). By gaining 
the legislative as well as executive power over the mineral resources area, Greenland’s sovereignty 
over its land was dramatically increased, and the newfound authority placed Naalakkersuisut in a 
stronger position to steer Self Rule both economically and practically via new legislation, much of 
which is laid out in the MRA. The explanatory notes to the MRA state that “the bill lays down the 
basis and framework for the future regulation of mineral resources”, with laws regarding 




Greenland to be more appealing to mining investors, actively naturalising the imaginary of 
Greenland as a resource frontier (Inatsisartut, 2009: 2). For these reasons, Poppel (2018: 9) 
identifies the act as “a cornerstone […] in the process of nation building”.   
 
   In their chapter on the ‘scramble for Greenland’s minerals’, Vikström and Högselius (2017) express 
discontent with the argument that a changing climate alone can explain increasing investments in 
Greenland’s mining sector, arguing growing external demand and local factors are just as important, 
if not more so. Indeed, the following analysis of the MRA will argue that Naalakkersuisut have 
actively pursued policies which make Greenland a more appealing resource frontier to mining 
companies. Of the four local factors identified by Vikström and Högselius (2017) which influence 
mining companies’ decision to invest, I would argue Naalakkersuisut have capitalised on Greenland’s 
pre-existing geological setting by promoting its large and rich ore deposits; have generated 
regulations and policies which directly benefit mining companies such as the exclusive exploration 
licenses detailed in the MRA;  and have sought to improve infrastructure and highlight their political 
stability in comparison to mineral supply zones like the Middle East by emphasising the cooperative 
relationship they have fostered with Denmark despite the ongoing process of decolonisation. 
Although efforts to attract mining companies are not entirely new to Self Rule as indicated by 
Sweden’s Raw Materials Group recognising Greenland’s mining legislation as amongst the most 
favourable in Europe in 2002, there has certainly been a proliferation of favourable mining 
legislation since Self Rule as part of the development of Naalakkersuisut’s proactive national mining 
strategies with the MRA taking centre stage (Dale, Bay-Larsen and Skorstad, 2018).   
 
   In practical terms, Naalakkersuisut have reified Greenland’s resource frontier imaginary by 
developing policies which work to the benefit of mining companies, particularly in the case of “an 
exclusive licence for exploration and exploitation of one or more mineral resources” established in 
Part 5 of the MRA (Inatsisartut, 2009: 7) The promise of exclusivity is clearly appealing to mining 
companies because it gives them the monopoly over the resources in a large licensing area meaning 
they are more likely to be competitive and reap the rewards. Exploitation licences are considerably 
longer than prospecting licenses with a total period of up to 50 years, meaning that should the 
company commit, they will be rewarded with the certainty of a long monopoly over some of 
Greenland’s resources and the ability to establish themselves in this emerging mineral sector. 
Although the MRA cites many ways in which Greenland can make money from mining ventures, it 
does acknowledge that “the licensee may be granted exemption from taxation of the activities 




have been”. This indicates that Naalakkersuisut is aware it cannot tax too heavily or it will become 
uncompetitive compared to other mining nations and so deter investment (Inatsisartut, 2009: 8). 
Furthermore, despite the many requirements Naalakkersuisut asks to the benefit of Greenland in 
terms of using local labour and contractors, the language of the MRA is fairly sympathetic towards 
business interests with many caveats making the requirements more lenient. In the case of labour 
for example, it is made clear that sourcing labour from Greenland is preferred, but that “the licensee 
may use foreign labour if labour with similar qualifications does not exist or is not available in 
Greenland” as is likely due to the skills gap in the Greenlandic workforce (Inatsisartut, 2009: 8; Erdal, 
2013).  
 
    Much of the MRA’s regulations are designed to ensure that Greenland gains as much from the 
establishment of its mining sector as possible, working to further its nation-building cause both 
economically and symbolically. For example, considerable effort is made to ensure that Greenland’s 
population benefits from mineral resource activities through job opportunities and the positive 
multiplier effect. A licensee “must have its registered office in Greenland, “must use labour from 
Greenland”, “must use Greenlandic enterprises for contracts, supplies and services” and should 
“process exploited mineral resources in Greenland” as far as possible, with the intention being to 
confine all money-making exploits to Greenland to maximise income, job creation, and upskilling 
opportunities (Inatsisartut, 2009: 7-8). Unlike the exclusivity of the exploration and exploitation 
licenses, prospecting licenses can be granted to multiple companies for the same area which is 
within Greenland’s interests because it means there is a higher chance of a commercial mineral 
discovery. As is a common trend throughout the MRA, potential sources of income are emphasised 
with Naalakkersuisut requesting “payment of a fee for granting licenses” (Inatsisartut, 2009: 7). They 
also maintain the right to “lay down provision of a payment fee for granting licenses, […] submission 
of applications therefor and consideration by the authorities of such exploration and exploitation 
licenses” (Inatsisartut, 2009: 7). On top of this, there are taxes which go to Greenland’s treasury at 
every stage, from an area fee (based on the size of the licensing area) to a profits fee (in which a 
share of the profits from resource activities go the government) as well as royalties (calculated on 
the basis of resources extracted). It is even noted that Naalakkersuisut can make money from energy 
installations established by licensees through area, volume and profits fees, an added bonus on top 
of the improvements such installations would already make to Greenland’s infrastructure and 
energy security at no additional cost to Greenland. In this way, the mining sector is being presented 





   The MRA also works to further Naalakkersuisut’s territorial claim through discussions of scientific 
surveying, particularly with the seemingly innocuous statement that “the Greenland Self-
Government may perform scientific and practical surveys of a general nature relating to mineral 
resources” (Inatsisartut, 2009: 3). As has been seen throughout Greenland’s history, scientific 
expeditions are instrumental to asserting sovereignty over a territory by occupying the physical land 
and generating knowledge about its geology. This was demonstrated during the 1920s Danish-
Norwegian conflict over eastern Greenland as the International Court ruled in Denmark’s favour 
because despite never establishing permanent settlements, its frequent scientific expeditions 
represented a kind of effective occupation (Nielsen and Knudsen, 2013). In this way, the salience of 
a presence on - and knowledge about - the land for claims to sovereignty and nationhood is 
revealed, exemplifying the importance of vertical and volumetric aspect of territory (Elden, 2013) 
and following Peluso and Lund’s (2013) assertion that frontier-thinking is actively enrolled in the 
process of territorialisation 
  
4.4 Premiers Speeches: Tracking Discourse Continuity and Change  
 
   Kuupik Kleist, Aleqa Hammond and Kim Kielsen are the three premiers who have fronted 
Naalakkersuisut over the period of Self Rule and they have all followed a broadly pro-mining agenda, 
with their speeches revealing both continuity and change in the ways Greenland and its possibilities 
as a resource frontier have been presented by the different governments across the decade. Kleist 
from Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) was the first Premier of the Self Rule Government and his speech at its 
inauguration on 21st June 2009 draws on some productive political, economic and environmental 
narratives. Firstly, he presents Self Rule as an important part of Greenland’s “democratic 
development” and refers to Greenland’s newfound position as a “leading country and an example to 
indigenous people everywhere”, locating Greenland’s place within the indigenous community 
worldwide and framing Greenland as a protector of indigenous rights (Kleist, 2009: np). The 
invocation of democracy works to present Greenland as a modern polity with international 
credibility while its championing of indigenous peoples worldwide acts as a reminder of its roots and 
shifts the scalar focus from the local to the international. Based on the speeches analysed which 
have been chosen for the insights they offer at key periods of transition (namely around the time of 
general elections), all three Premiers have been keen to reposition Greenland as a global player on 
the international stage and emphasise the ways it has opened up to international interests such as 
the mining industry, while still protecting Greenlanders heritage. Kleist (2009: np) talks of “being 




of our Greenlandic identity” reflecting the tensions inherent to nation-building whereby a cohesive 
sense of national-identity must be maintained while also garnering recognition from states 
internationally. Romanticisation of the Greenlandic environment is another rhetorical tool employed 
by Kleist (2009: np) to promote a united sense of Greenlandic identity through shared experience of 
Greenland’s “spectacular beauty” and “immense and captivating landscape” with its “incomparable 
freshness of air”. Despite their slightly different stances on mineral extraction, Hammond (2014: np) 
similarly alludes to Greenland’s “green mountains with beautiful wild flowers, long fjords and hot 
springs”, utilising Eden-like imagery to present Greenland as a hospitable land in her speech at the 
Arctic Summit in March 2014.   
 
    Despite such discussions of Greenland’s untouched natural beauty, both Kleist and Hammond 
highlight the importance of minerals and the opportunities mineral extraction represent for 
Greenland. Kleist (2009: np) cites Self Rule as the catalyst to achieving “the exclusive right to exploit 
the mineral resources in Greenland” which he is “very happy about” because “if Greenland is to 
strengthen its self-determination, [it] must have full responsibility for revenue generating areas”. 
This economically-centred extractive mentality is carried through to Kleist’s (2013: np) New Year’s 
address just a few months before the general election, in which he states that Greenland may have 
“plentiful mineral riches, but as long as they are lying in the ground […] they are no benefit to 
anyone”. This negates any inherent value minerals may hold following ideas of intrinsic valuation in 
conservation literature which can equally be applied to the mineral world (Sandbrook et al, 2011; 
Gustafsson, 2013). The active role Naalakkersuisut plays in enabling this resource frontier imaginary 
through the generation of mining-friendly laws can be seen in Kleist’s (2013: np) comment that “the 
legislation now in place gives us a good foundation for guaranteeing our raw material incomes”, 
again commodifying Greenland’s environment in the name of greater autonomy. Although 
Hammond also stresses the fiscal value of Greenland’s mineral resources with even greater positive 
speculativism, commenting that “a likely scenario for the future of Greenland is an economic growth 
supported by new large scale industries and oil and mineral extraction”, she was actually opposed to 
some of the legislation Kleist referred to, namely the Large Scale Projects Act. Indeed, the Economist 
(2013) argues that Kleist lost the general election on the 12th March 2013 to Hammond over the 
issue of mining, with Kleist seen by the electorate as too pro-investor due to his government passing 
a law which allows mining firms to hire cheap foreign workers. Hammond had promised to re-
evaluate this, wanting mining firms to pay royalties and protect Greenlandic workers. This debate 
was carried out in the context of London Mining Plc’s $2.3 billion project for an iron ore mine which 




Greenland to work on its construction (Scrutton, 2013). Although this project has failed to 
materialise following the British based company’s insolvency and the concession being taken over by 
China’s General Nice  Development Ltd  who have yet to begin exploitation, the significant public 
opposition and controversy it caused expose underlying tensions in Greenland’s mining debate 
concerning how far it will embrace international mining companies and foreign workers (Taagholt 
and Brooks, 2016; Lajeunesse and Lackenbauer, 2016). The 2013 general election was therefore 
“dominated by the question of how the territory should exploit its mineral riches” (BBC NEWS, 2013: 
np) with Siumut narrowly winning under Hammond’s leadership.  
 
   Although Hammond won the general election by presenting herself as more in touch with 
Greenlandic people and promoting a more protective approach to mining, Powell (2016) notes that 
assuming her premiership would be a move away from the ‘full steam ahead’ resource development 
approach was a serious misconception. Indeed, she had campaigned in favour of lifting the ban on 
uranium mining where Kleist was hesitant, narrowly pushing it through Inatsisartut on October 24th, 
2013. Hammond’s speech at the Arctic Summit in March 2014 reflects the ways in which 
Naalakkersusit have branded Greenland as a resource frontier, which is likely all the more 
promotional for being presented to an audience of international mining companies.  Hammond 
identifies two primary reasons for the recent development in Greenland’s mineral sector, framing it 
as a ‘perfect storm’ of environmental and social factors. Firstly she draws on what (Wilson: 2017) 
would describe as ‘cold rush’ rhetoric (the idea of a global warming driven boom in natural resource 
exploitation) by highlighting the “big opportunities”  climate change is creating in the Arctic with 
“oil, gas and hard minerals […] becoming available in quantities and qualities which are unique 
internationally” (Hammond, 2014: np). Such emphasis on abundance and exceptionality is 
reminiscent of Dodd’s and Nuttall’s (2016) discussion of an ‘El Dorado complex’, whereby Greenland 
is marketed as a veritable “resources cornucopia” to use Bridge’s (2001: 2155) phrase. This fairly 
ahistorical presentation is somewhat nuanced by the second driving factor Hammond (2014: np) 
offers for Greenland’s growing mining sector: “the very important constitutional changes which took 
place in the relationship between Denmark and Greenland in 2009 and 2010” which enabled 
Greenland to take over sole competence of its own resources. Like Kleist before her, Hammond 
(2014: np) pushes the image of Greenland as an emerging mining nation and a global player, stating 
that it “has the potential in the coming decades to become one of the most important suppliers of 
some of these hard minerals to the world market”, not only hyping Greenland’s resources like a 





   Continuity from Kleist’s economic focus can be seen in Hammond’s concern over the freezing of 
the block grant; however she ties this to the more emotive matter of the risk it poses to social 
welfare and so pushes for increased international investment. Nonetheless, this leads her to the 
same conclusion of framing “a self-sustaining economy based on our own resources” as Greenland’s 
only option. With this in mind, Hammond (2014: np) explicitly brands Greenland as “a frontier 
mineral and oil nation”, drawing on connotations of the unexplored awaiting discovery. Not only 
does she bring attention to Greenland’s “policy attractiveness” evidenced by it being heralded the 
“best country to do mining in 2013-2014” at Europe’s largest conference for mining investors and 
finance, she even challenges what she describes as Europe’s “negligible interest” aside from offshore 
oil when “European long term interest should be natural”. Even the EU has recognised this through 
its EURARE project which identified southwest Greenland as a potential source of rare earth 
elements (REES) crucial to manufacturing modern technologies, which is of great strategic 
significance given that the security of the EU’s REE supply is currently of concern (Goodenough et al, 
2016). It is unsurprising that Hammond is pushing this connection, given the need for international 
investment on top of the “difficult but necessary decisions” her government took, specifically the 
contentious decision to lift the uranium ban which has “paved the way for [Greenland] to fully 
exploit [its] rare earth element deposits” in areas such as Kuannersuit/ Kvanefjeld where the rock 
containing REEs also contains uranium. That Hammond is calling for greater European involvement is 
made more interesting given Greenland’s Overseas Country or Territory status within the EU, 
whereby its connection to the EU is leveraged through its special relationship with Denmark. Gad 
(2017: 11) argues Greenland has used this three-way relationship to its advantage in recent years as 
part of its “postcolonial sovereignty games” to assert its own authority on the international stage. 
Greenland’s efforts to represent itself are echoed in Kielsen’s New Year’s reception speech in 2016, 
in which he states that “Greenland has established its own representations in countries that are 
important to […] the development of Greenland, in places such as Copenhagen, Brussels and 
Washington DC”.   
 
   Following Hammond’s expense scandal and resignation, Kim Kielsen took over as leader of Siumut 
and led the party to a narrow victory in the November 2014 general election (Thelocal.dk, 2014). 
Wilson (2015) suggests Kielsen was carefully chosen by Siumut to match the mood of the electorate, 
stating it should come as no surprise that a former policeman with a reputation for his honesty, 
integrity and down-to-earth pragmatism was appointed acting leader following the political chaos of 
the spending scandal. Unlike Hammond’s impassioned speeches and gung-ho attitude, Kielsen’s 




expect Kielsen’s government to remain interested in future drilling and mining opportunities, it is 
likely that this interest will be counter-balanced by a renewed emphasis on boosting profits from 
existing industries firmly grounded in Greenland’s economic present”, and she was not far off. 
Kielsen’s framing of Greenland as a resource frontier has been more cautious, and this was no doubt 
reinforced by the faltering resource economy of late 2014 when world market oil prices dropped. 
Accordingly, in May 2015 at the Future Greenland Conference, Kielsen spoke about more practical 
and immediate options for boosting Greenland’s economy. The speech was pitched at Greenland’s 
business community, and Kielsen (2015: np) highlighted fisheries as “the country’s most important 
industry” which should be developed further, while also noting “tourism is another important area”. 
This pro-fishing sentiment was continued in his 2016 New Year’s reception speech and his 2018 
welcome speech to Naalakkersuisut, in which Kielsen (2016: np; 2018:np) repeated the phrase that 
fishing is Greenland’s “main” and “most important” industry respectively, and that this will remain 
the case “for many years”. This being said, Kielsen (2016: np) did acknowledge that it would be in 
Greenland’s interests to diversify and “move away from having to rely on one source of income”, 
referencing fishing but proving true for mineral resources as well. This acknowledgement marks a 
frame shift in Premiers’ discussions of the Greenlandic economy away from an emphasis on mining 
to the exclusion of all else, as was exhibited in the speeches of Kleist and Hammond.  
 
   Although Kielsen’s approach appears more measured, this is not to say that he has not promoted 
Greenland’s resource sector or potential as a mining nation. Alluding to the hit the international 
mining sector took, he notes that “despite the industry’s rollercoaster ride”, natural resources 
remain “one of the cornerstones [Greenland] must continue to make efforts to develop” (Kielsen, 
2015: np). Drawing heavily on ideas of resilience and perseverance, Kielsen offers the Oil and 
Minerals Strategy as a “good example” of how “maintaining our objectives will yield results in the 
long term”, pointing out that despite the gold mine at Nalunaq and the Seqi olivine mine being 
decommissioned, “there is now a ruby mine on the way and several interesting subjects on the 
drawing board”. Similarly, in his New Year’s reception speech Kielsen (2016: np) describes 
Greenland’s natural resources as “in an exciting development phase”, positively presenting 
Greenland as having “succeeded in maintaining interest from abroad” even “at a time of low world 
market prices”. By creating a positive buzz around new developments even in the face of adversity, 
Kielsen sustains Greenland’s resource frontier imaginary, while also recognising the relevance of 
other sectors and the focus the government must place on social factors like providing “practical 





   As a representative of Naalakkersuisut, Kielsen passes the mantle for developing Greenland’s 
mineral sector to Greenland’s private sector, suggesting it is their task to “see more of our people 
working with mineral resource exploration” while the government “must ensure the best possible 
framework” for private players to operate in. A similar rhetoric can be seen in Kielsen’s (2016: np) 
speech where he argues that resource developments “must be driven by private, and often foreign, 
investment” meaning Naalakkersuisut’s primary responsibility should be to provide “stable and 
competitive framework conditions for natural resources that make it attractive to invest in 
Greenland”. This more hands-off economic attitude is unsurprising given Siumut’s stance in favour of 
economic liberalism and reminds us that Naalakkersuisut is just one actor in the network of 
Greenland’s emerging resource sector (Wilson, 2015). From Kielsen’s perspective, Naalakkersuisut is 
presented as a faciliatory body tasked with promoting and developing Greenland’s resource 
potential in conjunction with Greenland’s private sector and international mining companies. The 
primary motivation offered is to secure “greater economic independence” for Greenland with 
mineral resources acting as “one of the bearing elements in Greenland’s economic future” (Kielsen 
2015: np; 2018: np). Even in 2018, Kielsen positively present’s Greenland’s mining progress, noting 
that compared to 2016 levels, “the amount of exploration activity has increased threefold” and 
stating that “things are moving ahead” for Hudson Resources anorthosite mine which has since 
begun operations, framing Greenland as an increasingly attractive and active resource frontier. 
Regardless of Kielsen’s more multi-faceted approach to strengthening Greenland’s economy, this 
narrative of achieving economic independence for Greenland at least in part via its mineral 
resources represents the most significant aspect of discourse continuity across all the Premiers’ 




   To recapitulate, this chapter has argued that frontier imaginaries must be understood in relation to 
Greenland’s unique political and geological position.  Parliamentary language and the speeches of 
premiers offer an excellent insight into the ways Greenland has constructed itself and its territory as 
a resource frontier. The Self-Government Act enabled the transfer of mineral rights and asserted 
Greenland’s right to self-determination, explicitly tying its mineral potential to the chance for 
greater economic independence from Denmark. Within a few months, the Mineral Resources Act 
established licensing laws highly attractive to the mining industry, encouraging increased exploration 
and crystallising Greenland as a place of opportunity in the minds of the international mining 




resource development. This is a big balancing act because in offering incredible fifty-year 
exploitation monopolies (five times the length of time Greenland has been operating under Self 
Rule), one could argue Naalakkersuisut are somewhat selling off their sovereignty, although the high 
royalty fees remind us who really owns the land and the MRA demands that all profit generating 
activities be located in Greenland. Furthermore, by encouraging exploration and exploitation activity 
and promoting geological surveys, Naalakkersuisut has endorsed frontier thinking to engender its 
physical presence on and in the land, forming part of its territorialisation campaign to assert 
Greenlandic sovereignty. This sustained pro-mining attitude can be identified on the part of 
Naalakkersuisut over the last decade despite changes in leadership, with all the Premiers pushing 
Greenland’s resource potential as a means to independence, although there have been some 
disagreements over the details as with foreign workers and uranium. The current Premier, Kim 
Kielsen, has also been more cautious and keener to diversify Greenland’s economy, no doubt due to 
the unreliability of mineral markets and his pragmatic nature. However he does still promote a 
resource frontier imaginary, most recently stating that mineral resources are one of the “bearing 
elements” of Greenland’s future (Kielsen, 2018: np). The documents analysed all reinforce the fact 
that Greenland’s independence is remarkably dependent on reducing reliance on Danish funds, thus 
their ability to commodify the environment and attract mining companies to convert their mineral 
resources into money is of utmost importance.   

















CHAPTER FIVE: Priorities and Challenges for a Mining Future in the 2014-2018 




"We should perhaps regard the rhetoric of state officials, the nicely crafted white papers and policy 
documents [...] as parts of a continuous state spectacle asserting and affirming the authority of the 
state."  (Blom Hansen and Stepputat, 2001: 37). 
  
   As the above quotation highlights, strategy documents are far from neutral and instead tend to 
promote state agendas, a matter of particular interest given Greenland’s not-quite-nation-state 
status and its Naalakkersuisut’s nation-building efforts. For this reason, a critical geopolitical 
approach using CDA is well placed to unpick the discursive strands which form part of the ‘state 
spectacle’ tapestry woven in Greenland’s 2014-2018 Oil and Mineral Strategy. Indeed, Bailes and 
Heininen (2012) have argued that unlike the clandestine military strategies from which the term 
originates, state strategies are produced with the intention of broadcasting a message to internal 
and external audiences. This is often a message which reflects positively on the country while also 
protecting its national interests, as can be seen in Greenland’s mineral strategy which has also been 
published in a popularised short form to “actively involve the general public” and convince them of 
Naalakkersuisut’s social commitments to “promoting prosperity and welfare for the Greenlandic 
society” (Jacobsen, 2016: np; Naalakkersuisut, 2014b: 4). Although the full-length strategy also 
pushes for a people-centred approach, frequently repeating the potential of the mineral resources 
sector to “create income and employment opportunities”, the very fact it is available in an English 
translation is indicative of Naalakkersuisut’s awareness of its external audiences, with the document 
inviting the attention of the international mining community. Such marketing is apparent in the 
preamble which states that Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 7) will “maintain and further develop” the 
preceding strategy’s efforts to “further the chances of making commercially viable oil or gas finds 
and to incentivise the mineral resources industry to obtain exploration and exploitation licenses”.  
This chapter will be structured around some of the primary policy areas of the 2014 Oil and Minerals 
Strategy, namely those of oil/gas, minerals, and sustainable development, offering a critique of the 
priorities and challenges to securing Greenland’s mining future (and associated autonomy) as they 
are presented by Naalakkersuisut.    
 
    The introduction to Naalakkersuisut’s long-form minerals strategy emphasises Greenland’s 




sector as critical not just for political gains, but also for economic and social ones or else its welfare 
society and very ability to provide for its people will be threatened. Attention is drawn to a 2011 Tax 
and Welfare Commission report which found that in comparison to other Nordic countries, 
Greenland has a higher poverty rate and lower average life expectancy. The mineral strategy goes on 
to highlight the increased risk Greenland’s already-strained welfare-system faces due to its ageing 
population which will require more public spending despite a decrease in public revenues as a result 
of having proportionally fewer economically active individuals. Kristensen and Rahbek-Clemmensen 
(2018: 39) would likely identify this introductory framing as a prime example of the Copenhagen 
school’s theory of securitisation, whereby “political actors garner support for their political goals by 
articulating a referent object as threatened, and advocating the certain policies are enacted to ward 
off the threat”. Operationalisation of this securitisation strategy can be seen in Naalakkersuisut’s 
(2014a: 17) statement that “the mineral resources sector must contribute to financing the welfare 
society” because “in the current economic climate, achieving the objective of increased self-
sufficiency is not realistic without substantially developing the mineral resources sector”. In terms of 
anticipated levels of development, Naalakkersuisut’s (2014a) long-term vision is to make a 
commercially viable oil find and have five to ten mines active at any time, with the goal for the 2014-
2018 strategy period being to have between three and five mines open and one to two offshore 
drilling projects established every second year. Needless to say, this was a very optimistic target as 
many oil exploration licenses have since been relinquished and at present Greenland only has 6 
mineral exploitation licenses, just two of which (the ruby and anorthosite mines) are actively 
extracting resources (Naalakkersuisut, 2018). This follows Bailes and Heininen’s (2012: 25) 
acknowledgement that institutional strategies tend to be “hopefully self-fulfilling prophecies rather 
than a bald statement of what can and will be done”, hence the need to consider the challenges 
which may obstruct Greenland’s mining future. With this critical approach, it is possible to see the 
ways in which Naalakkersuisut has naturalised mining as the only answer to Greenland’s societal 
woes and political goals, thereby promoting its own state spectacle.  
 
5.2 Hyping Hydrocarbons   
 
   As Poppel (2018: 1) notes, visions of an independent Greenland have been fuelled by the “hopes of 
a shortcut via discoveries of oil and gas”, a dream which has remained prominent in contemporary 
economic and political discourse despite the fact not a single barrel of Greenlandic oil has ever been 
extracted. This vision was in part powered by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) which 




and natural liquids (Gautier et al, 2007). Accordingly, Naalakkersuisut have pursued an intensified 
hydrocarbons strategy, with the number of active exploration licenses rising from just two in 2007 to 
twenty by 2011, the same year that Cairn Energy conducted eight offshore drillings, with all the wells 
coming up dry. This has not deterred Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 9), as can be seen in its 2014-2018 Oil 
and Minerals Strategy in which it prioritises “attract[ing] foreign investments in oil exploration 
activities in Greenland” and promoting “oil exploration activities in different regions” in the hopes of 
making a commercially viable oil discovery on which to establish an active oil field. The strategy 
reports positively on progress, stating that “a large number of exclusive oil/gas exploration licenses 
have been granted in Greenland”, and so calls for a strong marketing strategy to advertise licensing 
rounds at trade shows and conferences where Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 26) can “promote 
Greenland’s oil/gas potential, licence strategy etc. to oil and gas companies”.  
 
   Naalakkersuisut operationalises both externally perceived and internally controlled assets to 
present Greenland as an attractive resource frontier within the 2014 strategy. It portrays 
Greenland’s rich geological potential coupled with diminishing ice as a unique opportunity, while 
simultaneously reforming and developing its licensing system and tax models to provide a 
framework which makes Greenland an appealing investment prospect to prospective partners. 
Greenland’s exceptionality is emphasised, with Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 23) asserting that from a 
geological perspective “Greenland is one of the most interesting areas in the world”. This intrigue is 
then cemented by what Wilson (2017) would call a ‘cold rush’ rhetoric apparent in the statement 
that “climate change will probably make future exploration activities easier, both at land and at sea”, 
with the prospect of more open water and longer field seasons incentivising an increase in 
hydrocarbon developments (Naalakkersuisut, 2014a: 27). Such an approach to climate change also 
falls decidedly within the remit of Kristoffersen’s (2014: 145) “opportunistic adaptation”, where the 
economic advantages of climate change (adaptation) outweigh the desire to deal with its causes 
(mitigation). In its efforts to provide a better operational framework with which to attract 
hydrocarbon companies, Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 25) has made achieving “continuous efficiency 
gains in administrative licensing routine and procedures” a priority, with the goal being to develop 
an IT-based hydrocarbon licence management system as was done for minerals in the 2009 strategy 
period. A model licence is also provided to companies during licensing rounds to make the 
application process less laborious with continuity of the model ensuing a “stable framework for the 
industry in which to operate” (Naalakkersuisut, 2014: 25). Finally much consideration has been given 
to Greenland’s tax models with a benchmark analysis commissioned to ensure its government take 




possible while still being competitive. As Figure 3 below shows, Greenland’s total take of 53% offers 
the fourth best profit scenario for a license holder of the thirteen areas compared, making it one of 
the most lucrative and so attractive investments. The updated tax model for hydrocarbons also 
maintains Greenland’s interests, with the 2.5% royalty on turnover securing income from the outset 
and the enforcement of state participation via Nunaoil as a carried partner allowing Naalakkersuisut 
to remain actively involved,  while also “ensuring that oil extraction know-how is captured” to the 
long term benefit of Greenland’s mineral resources sector.   
         
 












   Efforts to increase hydrocarbon activity and the likelihood of an oil find during the strategy period 
can be seen in the licensing changes made by Naalakkersuisut. From 2014, smaller blocks of 1,000-
4,000 km2 rather than the original 10,000km2 were licensed off. This was presumably on the basis 
that it would mean more hydrocarbon companies covering more ground in greater detail, making an 
oil find more likely while also generating more revenue for Greenland in the meantime. Not only 
does the strategy call for a numerical increase in licenses, it also recommends spatial expansion, 
urging the introduction of licensing rounds for areas of particular geological interest in less-explored 
areas to the West, namely in Baffin Bay, Davis Strait, and the South West. However, this optimistic 
strategy was published before the considerable drop in market oil prices later in 2014 (see Figure 4) 
which led to a decline in international industry’s interest in Greenlandic hydrocarbons. The impact of 
the oil bust on Greenland can be seen in Figure 5 (overleaf) which shows the location of intended oil 
exploration licensing rounds for the 2014-2018 strategy period that were indeed made available, 
and the location of hydrocarbon exploration licenses as they stand today, with the 6 in the east 
Figure 3:  A bar chart comparing government takes between 13 countries and regions for 





remaining, but a dearth to the West where the strategy had hoped to expand hydrocarbon ventures. 
Upon referral to Naalakkersuisut’s (2018) document listing current petroleum licenses, it becomes 
apparent that all 7 of the exploration licenses in West Greenland have been or are in the process of 
being relinquished, with their statuses listed as “surrender is ongoing”. This reflects the volatility and 
unreliability of minerals markets which Wilson and Stammler (2015) talk of, meaning that societies 
such as Greenland take a risk by relying on extractive industries to secure their development. 
Despite this and the lack of any commercial finds as of yet, the latest reports suggest that 
Naalakkersuisut have not given up on their pipe(line) dreams. Indeed their 2019 budget states that 
they have “decided to increase focus on the hydrocarbon field to make [it] an economic potential for 
Greenland”, even putting 48 million DKK towards the cause (translated by Poppel, 2018 from 
Naalakkersuisut, 2018: 486). This, more than anything, reflects Naalakkersuisut’s steadfast 
commitment to making Greenland’s resource frontier imaginary a reality, evidencing Bridge and Le 
Billon’s (2013) proclamation that “oil seduces those who would control it, feeding dreams of instant 
wealth and economic transformation”.  

















































































































5.3 Strategising Greenland’s Minerals 
 
“In this age where discoveries are increasingly difficult to come by, Greenland remains a frontier 
exploration region” - Julie Hollis, Ministry of Mineral Resources and Labour, 4th March 2019.  
 
   Mounting interest in Greenland’s minerals over the last decade has predominantly been due to the 
proactive international marketing campaigns of the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Labour 
(MMRL), as is demonstrated by the above statement from the head of Geology at the MMRL which 
was given at the most recent Prospectors and Developers Association Canada (PDAC) Convention. 
PDAC’s Convention is the self-proclaimed “leading convention for people, companies and 
organizations in, or connected with, mineral exploration” and hosts a targeted Greenland Day which 
“gives the audience a unique insight into Greenland’s extraordinary mineral prospectivity […] and 
presents Greenland as a primary investment destination” (PDAC, 2019: np; Naalakkersuisut, 2019a: 
np). Hollis’ (2019) promotion of Greenland as a “frontier exploration region” reactivates discourses 
of Greenland as an undiscovered ‘tabula rasa’ from the era of Victorian exploration (see Craciun, 
2016), reminding us of the ways in which  “extractive spaces are constructed through a discursive 
dialectic which simultaneously erases socioecological histories and reinscribes spaces in the image of 
commodity” (Bridge, 2001: 2149). In her construction of Greenland as a resource frontier, Hollis goes 
on to say that “there are a lot of other factors [beyond the range of mineralisation types] which 
make Greenland quite exciting in terms of mineral prospectivity“, hinting at the actions 
Naalakkersuisut have taken. Indeed, the first page of the minerals section of Naalakkersuisut’s 2014 
strategy specifically lays out the parameters that it believes affect a mineral company’s decision to 
invest, revealing Naalakkersuisut’s awareness of and efforts to meet these demands. The list is in 
essence what Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 38) views to constitute an attractive resource frontier, namely 
having good “geological potential and prospects (metals and minerals), mineral legislation, fiscal 
conditions, institutional factors and framework conditions, and political stability”.  
 
   Naalakkersuisut’s marketing strategy, mineral licencing strategy, mineral tax models, and special 
allowances within the 2014-2018 strategy period all work to construct Greenland as a more 
attractive resource frontier. The marketing approach outlined in the 2014 strategy is a three-
pronged attack, meaning that in addition to representation at industry events like PDAC, Greenland 
also targets activities “directly at carefully selected countries, exploration companies, and investors”, 
as well as relying on official visits with the attendance of Naalakkersuisut members that “create new 




44). Mineral licensing has also been streamlined with effort made to “make licence terms robust to 
fluctuations in the global economy” and administrative processes made more “simple and easy to 
navigate” so that the application process is as user-friendly as possible (Naalakkersuisut, 2014a: 44) 
In line with this, a key objective of the mineral strategy is to “modernise the existing mineral licence 
management portal” over the 2014-2018 period (Naalakkersuisut, 2014a: 45). In recognition of 
Greenland’s logistical challenges and harsh environment, Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 41) has deemed it 
“necessary to offer licenses on more favourable terms with regard to exploration obligations and 
licence period”, particularly in North Greenland where it is “marketing the unique zinc potential”. 
This need to offer a mining scenario with enough perks to outweigh the challenges for companies 
carries through to Greenland’s new tax models, where a benchmark analysis was carried out for 
select minerals. Overall, Naalakkersuisut’s government take averages at between 37-38%, putting it 
at the lower end of the scale compared to other mining countries which fall around the 38-44% 
mark. For this reason, Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 54) again recognises the careful line it must tread 
because although it could increase its own take marginally, this would risk losing its competitive 
advantage, particularly considering Greenland’s “frontier status and challenging infrastructure” 
meaning any increase should be “modest”. To ensure Naalakkersuisut makes as much money as 
reasonably possible to finance public services (and indeed greater self-determination), exceptions 
are made for uranium, rare earths, and gemstones which are deemed more valuable and so more 
than double the royalty on turnover is charged.  In all cases, the royalty levied on company turnover 
is emphasised because it guarantees government income from year one, giving Naalakkersuisut 
greater economic autonomy.  
 
   In its status update for the minerals sector, Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 9) reports positively that “not 
only has the number of licenses increased, the companies’ exploration expenses have also increased 
over the years, from 2002-2012” with 2011 proving the most lucrative year. Government survey 
programmes are directed at “high-volume metals, ores and gemstones” in particular with “iron ore, 
copper, zinc, REEs, gold, uranium, and gemstones” prioritised because these minerals command the 
greatest global demand (Naalakkersuisut, 2014a: 40). Although this would suggest Naalakkersuisut’s 
vision of a Greenlandic mining nation is coming to fruition, the global demand in the mineral sector 
has actually  taken a downward turn since the 2014 strategy was published. As Vikström and 
Högselius (2017) note, from around 2014 the global mining industry faced problems, primarily due 
to a decline in demand and overproduction causing prices to decrease, not helped by the slowdown 
in China’s industrial growth. Although the effects have varied between mining projects in Greenland, 




expenses (Figure 7) which Naalakkersuisut had been so proud of are notable, with both dropping 
considerably although exploration licenses have begun to recover. It is within this context that we 
must view Naalakkersuisut’s (2014a: 60) primary goal for the 2014-2018 strategy period: to “grant 
three to five mineral exploitation licenses on an environmentally and socially sustainable basis”. 
Only 58 licenses were granted in 2018 which is less than the 67 of 2014, and to date six mineral 
exploitation licenses have been granted, but only two mines are actually active (Hudson Resources 
A/S anorthosite mine in Naajat and Greenland Ruby A/S in Aappaluttoq, both of which are in West 
Greenland) (Naalakkersuiut, 2019a).  
 
Figure 6: A graph showing the number of exploration licenses granted in Greenland from 2002-2018                             

























































Exploration expenses by mining companies in Greenland  (mill. DKK), 
2002-2016
Figure 7: A graph showing mining company exploration expenses in Greenland from 2002-2016                             




   As was discussed in section 4.4, the uranium debate regarding the lifting of the zero-tolerance 
policy has played a significant role in Greenlandic political discourse: thus uranium is given a 
dedicated section in the minerals chapter of the 2014 strategy. Despite the controversy over the 
legal existence of the ban in the first place (Thomasen, 2014) and the contentious nature of 
Inatsisartut’s vote which only passed 15:14 with 2 votes uncast (Nuttall, 2013), Naalakkersuisut 
frames the scenario positively, presenting itself as a responsible body fully capable of extracting and 
exporting radioactive material in Greenland. It is worth noting here that Greenland has had previous 
experience with uranium exploration, as Kvanefjeld plateau (Kuannersuit in Kalaallisut) which is 
currently being developed by Greenland Minerals and Energy Ltd (GME) was previously prospected 
by Danish-sponsored expeditions from 1955-1962 (Nielsen and Knudsen, 2013). This historic 
situation has been turned on its head because it is now Greenland’s Inatsisartut, rather than the 
Danish Folketing, who are using geological exploration to communicate their territorial sovereignty, 
with the additional hope that Greenland’s mineral wealth from REEs and uranium will contribute to 
its economic and political independence from Denmark. With such high stakes and considering the 
dual-use dilemma uranium poses with its “potential for electricity generation matched by its 
potential to yield the ultimate weapon of mass destruction” (Vestergaard, 2015: 1), it is important 
that Naalakkersuisut presents itself as a diligent government committed to ensuring the safe and 
peaceful usage of uranium. The majority of the 2014 strategy’s uranium section is therefore given 
over to demonstrating Greenland’s commitments and framing it as a peaceful nation, emphasising 
that “Greenland is already covered by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT)” and is even “covered by a voluntary additional protocol, which extends the IAEA’s 
[International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards to also include nuclear substances extracted by 
mining” (Naalakkersuisut, 2014a: 40).  
 
   In recognition that the road to uranium-supplier status will require close collaboration with 
Denmark due to uranium’s radioactive nature making it a matter of foreign policy, Naalakkersuisut 
(2014a: 40) clearly state that “a co-operation structure must be set up between the Government 
and the Government of Greenland” (Nuttall, 2013; Vestergaard, 2015). Even in translation, Gad 
(2017: 20) would likely read into the semantics, whereby Denmark’s authority is made absolute in 
the simple title of ‘Government’ and Naalakkersuisut is distinguished as the lesser ‘Government of 
Greenland”, with such “linguistic games” in which  Naalakkersuisut subtly acquiesces to Denmark 
deemed necessary if Greenland  is to successfully become a uranium supplier. In their discussion on 
whether Greenland should mine its uranium, Vestergaard and Bourgouin (2012: 3) identify uranium 




delineate legal authority between Copenhagen and Nuuk”. As Vestergaard later confirms with 
Thomasen (2016: np), a uranium deal was successfully negotiated which clarified competencies, with 
“Greenland retain[ing] control over mining, the environment and safety, and Denmark over non-
proliferation”. This marks the first step towards a common approach and administrative system for 
governing uranium extraction and trade, as was prioritised in the 2014 strategy. Only with such 
security measures in place will Greenland be able to develop its rare earth element industry, with 
the REE supply at Kvanefjeld holding the potential to supply 20% of global REE demand, offering a 
geopolitically salient alternative to China as well as a new source for China itself, which currently 
controls 97% of the world’s supply (Vestergaard and Bourgoiun, 2012).  Although Greenland is now 
one step “closer to building the world’s fifth largest uranium mine” at Kvanefjeld, it is important to 
remember GME has faced considerable opposition, both locally in Narsaq and internationally from 
ENGOs over the risks its mine poses to human health and the environment (Jamasmie, 2017: np; 
Avataq et al., 2013; NOAH, 2017). The “conflicting spatial storylines” between Naalakkersuisut and 
civil society as Bjørst (2016: 34) has described them can therefore be seen, revealing competing 
narratives in which uranium could either save or destroy the local community, and in doing so, build 
or break the nation (Myrup, 2012).  
 
5.4 Sustainable Development and Challenges to a Mining Future: Pipe(line) Dreams and 
Mineral Mirages?  
 
   Sustainable development underpins the 2014-2018 mineral resources strategy, as indicated by the 
term “sustainable” being invoked in some variation thirty-seven times throughout the document, and 
the longest chapter being devoted to the concept. The chapter opens with the statement that “current 
development of the mineral resources sector must be based on sustainability”, however 
‘sustainability’ has become something of a buzzword in contemporary policy documents. At its heart, 
sustainable development looks to balance economic and social development with respect for the 
environment, with the definition arising from the Brundtland Commission (WCED, 1987) of meeting 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs remaining the most popular. However as Waas (2011) makes clear, sustainability remains a 
contested concept both in its substantive content and what is needed to achieve it. Within the 
tripartite system of environmental, economic and social responsibilities, the three pillars are rarely 
given equal weighting, and it is in these nuances that the political emerges (Jacobsen, 2018). This is 
made most apparent in Naalakkersuisut’s (2014b: 21) quick-read document which emphasises their 




economy”. Although nods are made to environmental protection and ensuring “that development 
takes place in an environmentally sound manner”, it is clear that Naalakksersuisut (2014a: 66) is 
prioritising the social and economic over the environmental. Kirsch (2010: 87) would argue such 
deprioritising of the environment is common, with the “progressive redefinition of the term” 
‘sustainable development’ “emptying out” any original reference to the environment (Negri, 1999: 9). 
 
   Krueger and Gibbs (2007: 2) have argued that “engaging the politics of sustainability represents a 
gap in the current sustainability literature”, with Gad and Strandsbjerg (2019) asserting that this is 
still the case in academia today. The following will contribute to this lacuna by critically evaluating 
how Naalakkersuisut presents environmental concerns and politicises ‘sustainable development’ in 
its mineral resources strategy. Ultimately, one can argue as Kirsch (2010: 92) does that mining is a 
fundamentally unsustainable extractive process which leaves behind “scarred and ruined 
environments”, but this is far from the slant Naalakkersuisut take. Although they acknowledge the 
potential environmental impacts of mining, they refocus attention on regulating and reducing the 
risks, framing resource extraction as a manageable phenomenon which can be made sustainable. 
This can be seen in the self-congratulatory tone regarding the MRA amendments which established 
the Environmental Agency for Mineral Resources Activities to separate the regulatory function of the 
environmental area from the rest of mineral resources, and in the emphasis on Strategic 
Environmental Impact Assessments (SEIAs) which although beneficial for environmental protection 
on the surface, collectively work to box off and so diminish environmental risk. This follows the rise 
in rhetoric regarding conforming to high standards, with Greenland’s mineral strategy presenting 
climate change as a problem easily addressed by using ideas of best practice to rebrand mining 
activities as environmentally sound (Kristoffersen, 2015). Danielson (2002: 7) also picks up on such 
rebranding, arguing mining companies have responded to criticism from ENGOs by presenting 
themselves as “practitioners of sustainable development”. Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 66) even go so 
far as to frame mining companies’ environmental interactions positively, citing the contributions 
they are making via surveys which generate “new knowledge about nature and environment” rather 
than engaging with issues of contamination or pollution (Myrup, 2012). Like Kirsch (2010), we can 
identify ‘sustainable mining’ as an oxymoron used by those in favour of extractive industry to co-opt 
and neutralise criticism, an understandable approach on the part of Naalakkersuisut given the desire 
to present its activities positively and push a nation-building agenda. This tension reveals the 
considerable challenge pursuing ‘sustainable development’ represents, and reminds us of 




resources in order to gain more independence, and on the other hand the protection of our nature, 
which is so dear to us in order to maintain our cultural heritage.” 
   
   Given the economic and social emphasis afforded to ‘sustainable development’, the final chapter 
primarily engages with the practicalities of pursuing a mining future and the challenges Greenland 
will face. Greenland’s demographic difficulties and the risk posed by a volatile external mineral 
resources market have already been detailed, but there are significant additional obstructions to 
becoming a mining nation. Based on the platform it is given, one can assume the biggest social 
problem in the eyes of Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 68) is that of unemployment and the skills-gap, 
where there is a “gap between the capabilities demanded by the mineral resources industry, and the 
capabilities possessed by Greenland businesses today”. Multiple factors have contributed to this 
gap, from Greenland’s business structure characterised by small businesses which often function as 
“isolated markets” and are unable to meet mining companies’ high demand for goods and services, 
to the low-level of educational attainment which plagues Greenlandic society whereby “a large part 
of the labour force has no or only limited formal education”, with a dearth of relevant training in 
skills related to the mineral resources sector meaning jobs cannot be occupied by locals 
(Naalakkersuisut, 2014a: 68, 85). Indeed, Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 81) note that “how much 
Greenland will benefit from the mineral resources sector will be determined by the extent to which 
labour demand in the operating phase [of a mining project] is covered by Greenland labour”. For this 
reason, the 2014 strategy recognises that Greenland’s business community needs to be better 
integrated into mineral resources development (Rambøll, 2013), and that recruitment programmes, 
upskilling, apprenticeships and the involvement of Greenlandic contractors must be prioritised so 
that capacity is built, ensuring that the “the labour force matches demand” (Naalakkersuisut, 2014a: 
81). Without such efforts, Greenland will struggle to transform itself into an independent mining 
nation.  
  
   Finally, the technical and infrastructural difficulties posed by Greenland’s remote and icy 
environment are discussed.  As the 2014 strategy summarises, mining projects are “often located in 
open land areas outside existing towns and village communities and without any connection to 
infrastructure such as harbours and […] in relatively inaccessible regions of Greenland where climatic 
conditions like ice present major challenges to maritime traffic” (Naaalakkersuisut, 2014a: 78). 
Connectivity in Greenland is poor compared to other countries in which international mining 
companies have become accustomed to operating, with the cost of establishing Greenlandic mines 




is the default (Taagholt and Brooks, 2016). The 2014 strategy therefore considers how best to align 
airports and harbours with the needs of the mineral resources sector. Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 75) 
concludes there is a need to expand the air-travel options which at the time of publication consisted 
of two civil airports in west Greenland and eleven designed for small fixed-wing aircraft. More 
recently, geopolitical games have been played out through this demand for increased airport 
capacity, with an open tender being put out by Naalakkersuisut in 2018 to build larger airports in 
Nuuk, Ilulissat, and Qaqortoq for which the Chinese company China Communication and 
Construction Group prequalified (Sørensen, 2018). This caused Denmark to offer to finance the 
project in order to block Chinese infrastructural investment in Greenland, reflecting Danish unease 
over Greenland seeking out new partners for development (Bennet, 2018). Following Cairn Energy’s 
negative experiences of Aasiaat harbour during its 2011 drillings due to the “very limited space for 
storage and materials”, Naalakkersuisut (2014a: 78) recognises the need to extend and upgrade the 
capacity of Greenland’s harbours, particularly given that “the harbour facilities are generally, but 
specifically in Nuuk, under pressure”. On top of these travel and storage concerns, the strategy 
highlights the pressure Greenland’s limited telecommunications will be put under when mineral 
resource companies increase their activities in Greenland, with more fixed satellites or radio link 
connections being posed as a potential solution. Taken together, these logistical challenges may 
make Greenland a less appealing location for business, hence Naalakkersuisut’s favourable licensing 
framework, marketing strategies and the potential for financing via private-public partnerships come 




   This chapter has reflected upon the “state spectacle” which Naalakkersuisut constructs in its 2014 
Oil and Minerals strategy, presenting a positive outlook for Greenland’s mining future and making 
recommendations to ensure that the growth of its mineral resources industry benefits Greenlandic 
society as a whole (Blom Hansen and Stepputat, 2001: 37; Scott, 1999). In particular, it stresses the 
ability of the mineral resources sector to create income and employment opportunities, thus 
reducing unemployment rates and dependence on the Danish block grant. The strategy’s overall 
priority is to open between three and five mines with one or two offshore oil drilling projects 
established every other year within the strategy period, thereby supporting Naalakkersuisut’s wider 
vision of making a commercially viable oil find and having a booming mining industry to transform 
Greenland into a mining nation. In terms of oil and gas, Naalakkersuisut has pursued an intensified 




and in terms of scale, with new licensing rounds planned for west Greenland and the area of each 
reduced to increase the likelihood of a commercial find. The same marketing of Greenland as an 
attractive resource frontier applies to minerals, with Naalakkersuisut emphasising Greenland’s 
geological potential and the efforts it has made to offer favourable licensing legislation and 
competitive tax models. To maximise potential profits, projects involving iron ore, copper, zinc, REEs, 
gold, gemstones and uranium are prioritised because these minerals are in greatest global demand. 
An entire section of the minerals chapter is devoted to uranium in order to present Naalakkersuisut 
as a responsible governing body willing to work with Denmark and abide by international treaties to 
safely exploit and export uranium, reinforcing its commitment to peace so that Greenland can make 
the most of its resources.   
 
   Given the downward turn the mineral resources sector has taken globally in the years since the 
2014 strategy was published, with only two mines in operation and a commercially viable oil find 
proving elusive, it is fair to argue like Poppel (2018: 15) that the 2014 strategy “was still – and not 
least seen in retrospect – (overly) optimistic”.  Although not entirely surprising considering such 
strategies tend to be “inspiring visions” rather than “a bald statement of what can and will be done”, 
the sheer determination to push Greenland as a resource frontier is impressive in the face of so 
many challenges (Bailes and Heininen, 2012: 25). These challenges range from the demographic (an 
ageing population with fewer economically active individuals) to the social (high unemployment, low 
educational attainment, and a skills gap which cannot currently meet the needs of the mineral 
resources sector) and the structural (limited finances and a dearth of infrastructure across the board 
from a lack of roads to limited capacity in airport and harbours), not to mention the icy weather 
conditions which make operating in the high north a logistical nightmare. Although Naalakkersuisut 
offer some solutions to these problems such as offering more training programmes to narrow the 
skills gap, diversifying Greenland’s economy into mining will be no easy task.  For these reasons, the 
more critical perspective of Rosing’s (2014) report ‘For the Benefit of Greenland’ is to be expected. It 
concludes that although mineral resources will be important for Greenland’s development, the 
established potential for revenues has been severely overestimated, meaning it is unrealistic to think 
that this activity alone will generate enough profit to give Greenland full economic independence 
from Denmark. Indeed, Rosing (2014) warns that independence through hyper-industrialisation 
could lead to a “quick decline of Greenlandic culture, language, [and] political control, as seen in 






CHAPTER SIX: Conclusions - The Seduction of the Subsurface 
 
   This dissertation makes a unique contribution to the fields of Arctic critical (geo)politics, political 
geology, and the politics of Greenlandic resources in particular by engaging with state-generated 
documents which have only undergone superficial analysis, if at all, prior to this research. Through a 
focus on state statutes and speeches, it has discerned the ways in which Naalakkersuisut constructs 
Greenland as a resource frontier, strategising Greenland’s mineral resources in the hopes of 
achieving greater economic and political independence from Denmark. Bridge (2001) asserts that 
extractive resource spaces are actively produced through political choices and practices of 
exploration and exploitation. This goes some way to explaining the important role Naalakkersuisut 
plays as the primary promoter and practitioner of Greenland’s resource frontier through the 
marketing and legislative activities it performs, as has been discussed at length with regards to the 
Mineral Resources Act and 2014 Oil and Minerals strategy which both push Greenland’s appealing 
licensing laws and institutional framework. Similarly, Richardson and Weszkalnys (2005: 7) use the 
term ‘resource environments’ to conceptualise the complicated assemblage of “physical stuff, 
extractive infrastructures, calculative devices, discourses of the market and development, the nation 
and the corporation” which animate what could equally be described as the resource frontier, with 
discourses of development generated by the nation state again playing a central role. Work from 
Dodds and Nuttall (2016:118) supports the need to disentangle the role that the state plays in 
constructing resource frontiers, arguing “frontier speak” is a tool of statecraft which reinforces ideas 
of abundance and so reifies the resource frontier imaginary, fitting with Murray Li’s (2014: 13) 
description of the resource frontier as a “site of potential”. This potentiality can be imaginatively 
stretched from the possibility of harbouring resources to the prospect of providing political 
independence.    
 
   Careful consideration has been paid to the ways in which Naalakkersuisut actively constructs 
Greenland’s resource frontier to promote its economic growth and nation-building. The pro-mining 
rhetoric present throughout Naalakkersuisut’s statements from the SGA and MRA to the most 
recent minerals strategy and its premier’s speeches over the last decade collectively naturalise the 
idea of Greenland as a new site for resource extraction - a kind of ‘El Dorado’ made real (Dodds and 
Nuttall, 2016: 116).  In doing so, they impose a dominant discourse which erases any discussion of 
alternative means to diversifying Greenland’s economy, with the exploitation of Greenland’s oil and 
minerals presented as the only route to achieving greater self-determination. This attitude is 




indubitable. Legislation laid out by Naalakkersuisut offers attractive licensing laws, a user-friendly 
interface and appealing tax conditions for both oil and minerals which works to attract foreign 
investment, increasing levels of exploration and so strengthening Greenland’s emerging mining 
industry. Reverberating throughout all the documents analysed is the centrality of Greenland’s rights 
to its own resources, as established in the SGA and MRA. These rights have been long fought for, 
even proving instrumental in the Denmark-Greenland relationship during Home Rule but it is only in 
the last decade of Self Rule that they have been achieved.  
 
   Not only does authority over the subsurface give Naalakkersuisut the material and fiscal means to 
pursue self-determination, it also acts symbolically to support Naalakkersuisut’s sovereignty claims, 
with a presence on the land and Naalakkersuisut-endorsed geological activities working to assert a 
kind of vertical territoriality (Elden, 2013).  Although mining has dominated Greenlandic political 
discourse for the last decade, Kielsen’s frequent acknowledgement of the primary role fisheries 
continue to play suggests that the Naalakkersuisut of today is wary of committing to the resource 
frontier imaginary to the exclusion of all else, as was the case under Hammond when the 2014 
strategy was written. Kielsen’s more measured approach is understandable in the context of a weak 
global minerals economy and his desire to improve Greenland socially first, with an emphasis on 
bettering educational attainment so that Greenland’s youth can decide for themselves whether 
Greenland is ready for independence. In this way, the primary political questions in Greenland can 
be thought of as ‘independence how?’ and ‘independence when?’, with Kielsen’s Siumut seemingly 
more patient than Hammond’s although Kielsen (2018: np) does continue to recognise the role 
mineral resources play as a “bearing element in Greenland’s economic future.”   
 
   The priorities and challenges to achieving this mining future have been drawn out of the 2014 Oil 
and Minerals strategy. At its core, the strategy calls for increased levels of oil and mineral 
exploration which it is assumed will lead to the establishment of more oil fields and mines, resulting 
in considerable revenue for Greenland.  The mineral resource sector is held up as a way to generate 
much-needed income and employment opportunities, with emphasis being placed on the need to 
integrate Greenland’s business community and workforce in order to maximise the gains. There are 
high hopes for a commercially viable oil discovery despite previous drillings proving unsuccessful, 
with the strategy pushing for more licensing to make this more likely. In its minerals section, 
Naalakkersuisut strategically prioritises metals which are in high global demand, namely iron ore, 
copper, zinc, REES, gold and uranium as this will offer the most profit, evidencing Zimmerman’s 




change over time. This means we must not only assume the political life and value of geological 
resources are determined by the “actual utilities of their chemical properties”, but also by changing 
“perceptions of how these material and meaningful properties might serve diverse territorialities 
over time”, with Naalakkersuisut able to strategize Greenland’s mineral resources towards nation-
building ends now that it has authority over the subsurface (Klinger, 2015: 574).  The 2014 Oil and 
Minerals strategy therefore walks a careful line between pushing policies which will attract 
international investment to secure Greenland’s mining future and ensuring that Greenland will 
benefit socially and economically from such resource development.  Overall, it offers a very 
optimistic outlook, suggesting that three to five mines and at least two offshore drilling projects will 
be established within the strategy period of 2014-2018. Needless to say, no oil has been found in 
viable quantities and only two mines are active to date, although progress has been made in 
securing the necessary conditions to extract and export uranium which is key to GME’s REE project 
in Kvanefjeld being approved.  
 
   Considerable demographic, social and infrastructural obstacles stand in the way of Greenland 
becoming a mining nation and these have been compounded by the downward turn in the global 
mineral resources market over the last few years (Vikström and Högselius, 2017; Dale, Bay-Larsen 
and Skorstad, 2018). Naalakkersuisut will have to deal with Greenland’s ageing population, improve 
educational attainment rates, offer more training directed at the mineral resources sector to build 
capacity, expand its infrastructure in terms of roads, airports, harbours and telecommunications to 
support mining projects, and find ways to finance such projects, perhaps through public-private 
partnerships if it wants to develop its mineral resource sector significantly. More fundamentally, 
Wilson (2017) reminds us that it is not a foregone conclusion that a booming natural resources 
industry will provide the funds required to replace the Danish block grant, or that the benefits will 
trickle down to Greenland’s population, with Rosing (2014) warning that if carried out too hastily, 
independence via hyper-industrialisation could do more harm than good. Ultimately, Wilson (2017: 
512) argues that Greenland’s mineral resource sector is much too small, and it is far too soon to 
know whether it can “deliver the dazzling economic outcome forecast – let alone whether or not this 
outcome will benefit Greenland”. Dingman (2014) similarly concludes that economic freedom on a 
national scale does not necessarily equate to equal opportunity in society, and the risk remains that 
the high levels of foreign investment and labour required to extract sufficient mineral resources to 
achieve economic independence in the near future could force Greenland to shift dependence from 
Denmark to another partner like China. Furthermore, the dilemma of balancing the pressing needs 




environmental standards prevails (Kuokkanen, 2017). Although Naalakkersuisut claims sustainable 
development underpins its approach to resource extraction, its interpretation appears to focus on 
social and economic sustainability and only pays lip-service to the environmental, leading us to 
question whether ‘sustainable development’ can truly be achieved when mining is fundamentally 
unsustainable. We must therefore ask what price Greenland is willing to pay for its independence, 
but as Gerhardt (2011) notes, the political path it chooses is not one which we as outsiders should 
judge.   
 
   This dissertation has responded to Dalby’s (2007) call for research which takes the ‘geo’ in 
‘geopolitics’ seriously, working to establish a more materialised form of critical Arctic geopolitics 
which uses the political geographies of mining in Greenland to highlight how natural resources are 
strategized in state discourses. It makes an important contribution to the emerging field of political 
geology and goes some way to filling the lacuna which currently exists in geography regarding 
resource geopolitics and the vertical and volumetric aspects of territoriality. Although focusing on 
the political ramifications of mining in Greenland, it speaks back to broader geographical research 
regarding resource extraction and issues of self-determination, both in the Inuit world and globally. 
Engaging with resource extraction in the high north will only become more pertinent as the mining 
industry is expected to “play a major role in the Arctic states in decades to come” (Dale, Bay-Larsen 
and Skorstad, 2018: 2). This means there is considerable scope for further research building on this 
dissertation which has taken state narratives as an entry point into the resource debate. By focusing 
on the state-spectacle Naalakksersuisut endeavours to create, it has prioritised the practical strand 
of geopolitics which is characterised by policy perspectives, leaving fertile discussions regarding 
portrayals of the resource frontier in the media (popular geopolitics) open for exploration. 
Furthermore, a consideration of mining companies’ perspectives and the ways Naalakkersuisut 
interacts with the industry in practise at events such as PDAC could prove fruitful. These approaches 
would likely reveal further nuances in the resource frontier imaginary, reminding us that “Arctic 
imaginaries, like the Arctic itself, are never settled” (Steinberg et al, 2015: 9).  For this reason, it will 
become all the more important to keep our eyes trained northwards as the Arctic shifts from the 














Appendix A:  
 
Table 1: Documents analysed in this dissertation  
Author Date Title Document Type 
Folketing 2009 Self-Government Act Act of Danish Parliament  
Inatsisartut 2009 Mineral Resources Act Act of Greenlandic Parliament 
Naalakkersuisut 2014a Greenland Oil and Mineral Strategy 
2014-2018 
Government Policy Document 
(long read) 
Naalakkersuisut 2014b Our Mineral Resources –         
Creating Prosperity for Greenland: 
Greenland’s oil and mineral 
strategy 2014-2018.  
Government Policy Document 
(quick read) 
Kuupik Kleist 2009 ‘Celebration speech by Premier 
Kuupik Kleist on inauguration of 
Greenland Self-Government 21st 
of June 2009’  
Speech 
Kuupik Kleist 2013 ‘New Year Address 2013’ Speech 
Aleqa Hammond 2014 ‘Arctic Summit Speech: Open for 
business – developing the Arctic’s 
economic potential’ 
Speech 
Kim Kielsen 2015 ‘Future Greenland Conference 
Speech: Growth and Welfare – 
Scenarios for Greenland’s 
Development’ 
Speech 
Kim Kielsen 2016 ‘New Year Reception Speech 2016’ Speech 















Election Date Winning party % votes Premier 
2nd June 2009 Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) 44.06 Kuupik Kleist 
12th March 2013 Siumut  42.8 Aleqa Hammond 
28th November 2014 Siumut 34.3% Kim Kielsen 
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